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Executive Summary  
 
By examining both the legal framework for local elections 
in Syria and the actual 2018 elections this paper reveals 
substantive gaps between legal procedures in Syria, their 
implementation and the way they are perceived by people. 
It exposes the level of mistrust people have with the 
overall system of governance which they believe it works 
only for the top corrupt elite inside and outside the 
government.  
Based on field research conducted by the by the leading 
author during all the stages of the 2018 elections, the 
paper presents a detailed account of the September 2018 
local council electoral process in the government-
controlled areas, shedding light on the most important 
elements pertaining to the candidates and their electoral 
campaigns; women in this process; and how the elections 
were carried out on the election day.  
The paper goes beyond the government-controlled areas 
and discusses how elections for opposition-controlled 
areas and Syria Democratic Forces (SDF) controlled 
areas in northeast Syria were conducted. The paper also 
presents an opportunity for understanding in part the 
situation in areas that were regained by the government 
from 2018 on such as Ghouta, where many expressed 
their frustration as they see those who profited from their 
suffering when these areas were under siege becoming 
the new figures in the councils. Disinterest and the 
position of ‘Our apathy is even greater now than it was 
before 2011’ is widespread in these areas.   
 
The ratio of the number of candidates to the number of 
seats was lower than previous elections (2.24 compared 
to 2.43 in 2011 and 3.3 in 2007).  The majority (70%) were 
candidates from the Ba‘ath Party and their allies, most 
prominently the Communist Party and the Syrian Social 
National Party, two main parties in the Ba’ath-led National 
Progressive Front, while the remainder (30%) were 
independent candidates. Although the new 2012 
constitution in Syria removed article eight which was part 
of the old constitution and which declares the Ba‘ath 
Party as the ‘leader of state and society ’, the election 
process was still dominated by the party. The previous 
Ba‘ath Party dominated ‘Progressive National Front’ lists 
was replaced by “The National Unity List” in which Ba‘ath 
Party candidates had the lion’s share. Some exceptions 
were observed, such as the independent candidates in 
Tartus who came together and formed an independent 
electoral alliance which won the elections against the 
National Unity List. 
Very little campaigning took place before the elections, 
very few candidates had manifestos and most people 
interviewed for the paper said they knew little about the 
candidates and showed a position of strong disinterest in 
the whole process. The election day was not declared as 
a public holiday. The government announced that 56% of 
those eligible for voting did turn up to the election, but our 
observation, through our field visits, showed that the 
actual figure is so much lower. Most of the voters 
observed in the field research for this paper were either 
university students or civil servants who have been asked 
by their institutions to go and vote. In al-Ba‘ath University 
in Homs, students were even kept inside the campus and 
only allowed to leave if they vote. Many violations took 
place, some of which were reported in the media and 
social media. In a rare incident, the Supreme 
Administrative Court had ruled that the vote in 18 
constituencies in Tartus was void and that re-elections 
should be held there, based on the complaints of some 
candidates.  Civil society played hardly any role in 
observing the elections although some civil society 
organisations ran campaigns to encourage people to take 
part and to run for the elections. 
The paper helps to increase understanding of why 
elections were held at this stage of the Syrian conflict, 
reasons which include: particular political and economic 
gains made by the regime; the implication that the conflict 
was nearing an end, and therefore the readiness to begin 
the upcoming reconstruction process; the ability to 
accommodate refugees and give them incentives to 
return; and finally the importance for the Syrian 
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government to–in its own words–fight terrorism, which 
was one reason for the delay in holding elections 
approximately a year and a half before.  
In analysing the political economy of these elections the 
paper notes that Law 107 gave the local councils local 
authority over some aspects of the economy and 
construction investments, and thus the elected councils 
will have a strong role in the upcoming reconstruction 
phase, regarding both planning and implementation. It 
was important therefore for the regime to ensure to 
ensure that members of these councils are strong 
supporters.  Earlier in 2014, the Reconstruction 
Committee had been formed by the government and the 
Minister of Local Administration had been appointed as 
its president. Among the committee’s tasks was the 
implementation of projects regarding the return of 
essential services and the rehabilitation of infrastructure 
in the destroyed areas. It is this which explains the 
interest of Holding companies and businessmen in 
funding those close to them to gain access to the local 
councils.  
Similarly, Law 10 issued in April 2018, which allows for the 
introduction of new “redevelopment zones” based on the 
suggestion of the Minister of Local Administration and 
Environment. It also gives the executive office within the 
administrative unit wide-reaching powers in planning and 
implementation for the new redevelopment areas. And it 
is here that the importance of electing new local councils 
to start to apply this law becomes important since it 
would not be legal to apply the new law with council 
members whose term has already ended. It is also 
advantageous to apply the law with the implication that it 
is part of Syria’s decentralisation, giving a more positive 
outward image of the country in the hope of convincing 
regional and western governments to invest in a Syria 
whose climate is one of “democracy, openness and 
decentralisation”. 
The paper reflects a very big the gap between the text of 
the law and its implementation in Syria. It asks why 
people, not even those who do not oppose the regime, 
were not interested even in taking advantage of the 
increased powers of the local authorities offered by law 
107. The gap comes not only from the way the Syrian 
government applied the law but also because of the 
citizens' impressions of the law and of the overall system 
of governance. Other reasons included the big loss of 
confidence people have in the overall system of 
governance including the regime and its laws, the 
significant spread of a sense of futility and losing hope 
for real change, even when the law provided a legislative 
opportunity for this change, a strong belief that the 
electoral process in Syria made a mockery of elections 
and finally the significant deterioration in the standard of 
living of most Syrians and their preoccupation with 
survival priorities.  
Although female representation seemed to be better than 
the 3% of 2011, the figures are still very low and did not 
exceed 10% in most areas. We also noted the reluctance 
of leading women figures in the country to participate in 
the elections and that they mobilised their parties to 
boycott the elections because they did not believe in their 
usefulness.  
On policy implications, the paper stresses that 
constitutional and legal changes are a necessary but 
insufficient condition for the process of democratic 
transition in Syria.  Any meaningful political transition 
process will indeed require substantial changes in 
constitutional and legal frameworks and should be based 
on electoral processes at several levels. But these 
amendments and procedures alone will remain futile and 
could end up as a facade for the authoritarian regime, if 
not accompanied by other conditions and measures.  
Besides legal changes, real change requires actions that 
restore confidence in the overall system of governance 
and at all levels.  Several insurance policies are needed in 
order for the Syrians to believe in any legal change and to 
be more likely to complying with it and thus giving it 
meaning or legitimacy. What is needed is; first, wide 
consultation and participation in the construction of 
these laws; second, for them to have confidence that 
these laws and procedures, such as elections are 
designed to serve their public interest, and third, that the 
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process should be as inclusive as possible. 
A genuine democratic process of change in Syria also 
requires a structural change in the political economy that 
allows the dismantling of the relationship between power 
and money, that opens for all the possibility of equal and 
fair participation and benefiting from the process of 
development and reconstruction, and that allows citizens 
to exercise their supervisory and monitory role in a 
manner protected by law. 
The increase in the proportion of female breadwinners in 
Syria and their increased participation in the labour 
market in Syria presents another reason for the calling for 
quotas for women in elections, at all levels, to ensure their 
fair representation. Increasing their representation is also 
an important entry point for changing the political 
economy structure of the local councils, thus weakening 
the networks of private interests and reducing corruption, 
especially since these networks are usually dominated by 
men. It is important to note that it is not enough just to 
allocate a quota to women to encourage them to 
participate in the elections and to run for them. What is 
also required is a number of procedures and programs of 
political empowerment and capacity building for women. 
Certainly, the process of change in Syria will not be easy 
and will take a long time, but not putting the process of 
change on the right track from the outset will only ensure 
progress in the wrong direction. 
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1 Introduction 
Last June, just as the Syrian conflict had entered its 
eighth year, Syrian President Bashar al-Assad issued 
Decree No. 214 for 2018, stipulating that elections for 
members of the Local Councils would take place in 
September of that year.  
As a matter of fact, and in accordance with Local 
Administration Law No. 107 issued in 2011, these 
elections should have taken place at the beginning of 
2016, when the term of the local councils–elected in 
December 2011–had come to an end. However, the 
Syrian government decided to extend the term of the 
councils, under the pretext that elections could not be 
carried out while Syria was in the midst of a war on 
terrorism. This was despite the fact that parliamentary 
elections were in fact carried out as planned in 2014. The 
reality was that the central government had lost control of 
many areas as a result of the war, including local councils, 
vital civilian facilities, as well as military and security 
control. The Syrian government had lost governing power 
and, as a consequence, its capacity to manage any kind 
of election at a local level. It was this that which ultimately 
prevented the Syrian government from holding local 
council elections at their proper time in 2016.  
During the most recent term of these councils in 
government-controlled areas–from 2011 until the 
elections held in September 2018–local residents did not 
feel many tangible changes. Public services and the pace 
of development remained poor, notwithstanding that 
most of these areas which remained under government 
control did not descend into conflict, and were safe from 
the most brutal aspects of the war. Moreover, despite the 
removal in 2012 of the eighth article from the Syrian 
constitution designating Syria’s Arab Socialist Ba‘ath 
Party (Ba‘ath) as the leading party in state and society, the 
members of the local councils remained Ba‘athist, and 
likewise Ba‘ath branches and security apparatus 
remained in control of most of the local administrations, 
in all sectors. In this way, the hiring, firing and informal 
nepotistic practices remained unchanged; council 
members continued to be dismissed for unknown 
reasons, and others appointed without elections. 
Likewise, the weakness of the regime during the conflict 
in keeping its hold on the locally run services increased 
the concentration of such services at the central level. 
The representation of women in these local councils, 
elected in 2011, did not exceed 3%.1  
                                                     
1 بعشلا سلجمو ةيروسلا ةأرملا, National Center for Research and Opinion Poll 
website: https://goo.gl/ywbmE5, date of publication, March 30, 2016, last 
accessed, October 18, 2018 
This was reflected in the atmosphere surrounding the 
2018 local elections; many expressed a sense of 
despondency, and a disinclination to participate in both 
the elections and the nomination process. The feeling 
was that the election process was merely for show, and 
would simply result in councils that were not reflective of 
local community needs. Equally, many others did not 
know elections were happening until polling day, given 
their preoccupation with day-to-day stresses and 
economic strains. There was no sign that previous 
councils had been effective in real terms in the 
government-controlled areas. Syrian cities saw tentative 
publicity campaigns which were limited to a few signs, 
photographs and election tents, in stark contrast to 
previous electoral campaigns, both local and 
parliamentary. The day of the election was met with a 
meagre turnout at the polling stations, and many electoral 
lists succeeded by default because there were not 
enough candidates to fill all the assigned seats. These 
lists were predominantly those of the Ba‘ath Party.  
This paper presents a summary of the local council 
electoral process in Syria in September 2018, shining a 
light on the most important elements pertaining to the 
candidates and their electoral campaigns; women in this 
process; and how the elections were carried out on the 
election day on 16 September. This paper will help to 
increase understanding of why elections were held at this 
stage of the Syrian conflict, reasons which include: 
particular political and economic gains made by the 
regime; the implication that the conflict was nearing an 
end, and therefore the readiness to begin the upcoming 
reconstruction process; the ability to accommodate 
refugees and give them incentives to return; and finally 
the importance for the Syrian government to–in its own 
words–fight terrorism, which was one reason for the 
delay in holding elections approximately a year and a half 
before.  
This research paper relied on interviews by the leading 
author with several candidates for the local council 
elections, active members of Syrian public life, and a 
random sample of residents in different districts and 
provinces of the country. All names were kept confidential 
for security reasons and in the interest of their safety 
given their residence in Syria. The paper also relied on 
personal observations by the leading author during field 
visits. Observations were made of the electoral 
campaigns and the prevailing atmosphere in the weeks 
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leading up to the elections; of the election day itself in 
several polling stations and government institutions; and 
also of the days following the election with the end of 
voting, the vote count and the announcement of results. 
The paper also relied on several media and government 
reports which were published in July, August and 
September 2018, and analytical papers on the 
development of local administration laws and electoral 
laws in Syria, which were developed by the Syria Team in 
the Conflict Research Programme at the London School 
of Economics and Political Science.  
This paper is divided into three parts. The first part 
(section 2) discusses the general background and legal 
context particular to the local elections in Syria, beginning 
with the issuing of the Local Administration Law No. 15 
issued in 1971, and the subsequent updated version, Law 
No. 107 issued in 2011.  
In the second part (section 3), we will look into what 
happened prior to the elections in question, from the 
nomination mechanisms for these elections, to how the 
articles of Law 107 were applied. We will also look at a 
sample of candidates from different regions and political 
traditions, including reasons for their nomination, and 
their campaigns and manifestos. We will shed light on the 
experiences of the areas outside government control and 
areas of local reconciliation which were for many years 
under opposition control and were then retaken by the 
government. We will also discuss the reasons some 
active members in the public sphere chose either not to 
take part in this process or to withdraw from it.  
In the third part (section 4), we will talk about election day 
itself, which fell on 16 September, 2018. We will examine 
the atmosphere on polling day in several provinces of 
Syria; the violations which were observed in all stages of 
the polling and vote count; and the participation or lack 
thereof by the media and civil society. We will then study 
the results of the elections and how they were announced, 
looking at several areas, and the gender representation of 
the election winners.  
2 Background and Legal Context 
In this section, we will discuss the most important articles 
of the two most recent laws which deal with local 
administration in Syria: Law 15/1971 and Law 107/2011. 
                                                     
2 The full text of the law is found on the Syrian Parliament website: 
http://www.parliament.gov.sy/arabic/index.php?node=201&nid=4390&ref
=tree& 
3 The full text of the law is found at https://goo.gl/GLkLvA         
4 Gharibah, M. 2018, Local Elections in Post-Conflict Syria, Conflict 
Research Programme, London School of Economics and Political Science: 
https://goo.gl/dd31Av, date of publication December 2018, last accessed 
December 2018. 
We will also look at the General Election Law which 
addresses the processes of nomination and voting and 
which was issued in 2014.  
Local councils in Syria are subject to Decree 107/2011 
which comprise the Local Administration Law,2 and which 
is considered as an amended version of the Law issued 
by Decree 15/19713 a short while after former president 
Hafez al-Assad assumed power following the coup 
termed ‘the Corrective Movement’ in 1970.  
 
 Despite the removal in 2012 of the eighth 
article from the Syrian constitution 
designating Syria’s Arab Socialist Ba‘ath 
Party (al-Ba‘ath) as the leading party in state 
and society, the members of the local councils 
remained Ba‘athist, and likewise the al-Ba‘ath 
branches and security apparatus remained in 
control of most of the local administration, in 
all sectors.   
Law 15 was issued as an attempt to increase the authority 
of the Ba‘ath Party, which had been in power in Syria since 
1963, throughout the country. This was codified through 
the division of tasks between the central government and 
the local administrative units, whose delegation level was 
itself increased by the central government. This was done 
by transferring certain responsibilities and authorities–
related to planning, implementation, and control of 
financial resources–from central control to a group of 
specific elected representatives on the local level. 
However, the governor – who was appointed centrally and 
was not an elected official – continued to have the power 
of oversight, wide-reaching authorities and 
unprecedented judicial immunity.4 The result was the 
near-absolute authority of the Ba‘ath party branches and 
the security forces. Local units ended up acting as a 
scaled-down version of the existing divisions in the 
National Progressive Front,5 with representatives of the 
Front’s parties sitting in the provinces’ councils. The 
Ba‘ath Party also monopolised the largest portion of the 
seats and effectively wielded singular control over many 
remote towns and villages’ councils, where there was a 
5 The Progressive National Front is a coalition which was formed in Syria 
in 1972 from a group of 12 communist, socialist and nationalist parties 
and forces; within the central leadership, the Socialist Arab Baath Party is 
represented by a proportion of 50% plus one compared to the other 
parties, making it the dominant party within the Front. For more 
information, see the Front’s website: http://www.pnf.org.sy/index.php 
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minimal representation of other parties. It was in this way 
that Law 15 was enacted, as a codification of the 
relationship between the administrative units and the 
central authority without an actual application of the 
concept of decentralised power.6  
President Bashar al-Assad issued law 107 in mid-2011, as 
a part of changes he was trying to implement during the 
first few months of the uprising, hoping to calm and 
containing the popular anger. The formulation of Law 107 
had been initiated in the middle of the first decade of his 
rule, which began in 2000, to avoid the shortcomings that 
presented themselves in the previous law. But the law 
was not finally issued, however, until 2011.7  
The law divides Syria into administrative units which are 
granted legal personality and have financial and 
administrative independence. These units are provinces 
(also known as governorates), cities, townships and 
towns.8 A province is a geographical jurisdiction which 
comprises several cities, townships, towns, villages and 
farms. A city is the centre of a province, district, or 
residential area whose population is over 50,000. A 
township is the centre of a sub-district or residential area 
or group of residential areas whose population ranges 
between 10,001 and 50,000. A town, meanwhile, is every 
residential area or group of residential areas whose 
population ranges between 5,001 and 10,000.9 The 
number of residents in each administrative unit is set 
based on data from the Central Office of Statistics; each 
person is included in the unit in which his/her information 
was recorded at birth in the civil record – or what is known 
in Syria as ‘nufus’ – and not within the unit in which she/he 
lives. Therefore, the division of administrative units and 
distribution of roles and authorities to them depends 
wholly on the number of citizens born there, and not on 
the number living there.  
Law 107 stipulates the decentralisation of powers and 
their devolution to the people. This would be done through 
the creation of administrative units able to set and 
implement developmental plans pertaining to civil society 
and to determine the necessary financial revenue in order 
that these units can fulfil their developmental role.10 In 
principle, this law also devolves additional and wide-
reaching authority to the elected local councils, which 
                                                     
6 Gharibah, M. 2018, Local Elections in Post-Conflict Syria, Conflict 
Research Programme, London School of Economics and Political Science: 
https://goo.gl/dd31Av, date of publication December 2018, last accessed 
December 2018. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Article 7 of Law 107/2011 
9 Article 1 of Law 107/2011 
therefore become a link between the Syrian people and 
their government. This is through transferring decision-
making power in sectors such as education, health, 
private investments and revenue management, from the 
central ministries to local authorities, and giving the local 
councils the upper hand in the provision of services to 
their communities. In this way, the role of the central 
authorities would be limited to planning and enacting 
large-scale projects which the administrative units could 
not themselves carry out. Law 107 also presented several 
new principles which had not been present in the old 
version of the law, such as local societal development, the 
application of the principle of democracy, the application 
of the decentralisation of powers and responsibilities, 
accountability, and transparency.11  
A constitutional change which extended all the way to the 
status of the Ba‘ath Party accompanied the issuing of this 
law. While through article eight of the old constitution, the 
Ba‘ath Party was designated as the ‘leader of state and 
society’, this article was amended in 2012 to specify the 
political pluralism of the state’s political system. Law 107 
was also accompanied by the issuing of Legislative 
Decree12 100/2011, which comprises the Parties Law and 
allows for the forming of political parties and 
membership. The new constitution, issued in 2012, 
meanwhile affords the local administration system a 
constitutional guarantee; article 130 stipulates that “The 
Syrian Arab Republic is made up of administrative units, 
and the law determines their number, borders, domains, 
temporal limitation to their being a legal personality, and 
their financial and administrative independence”. Article 
131 thereafter stipulates that “the organisation of local 
administrative units is based on the application of the 
principle of decentralisation of powers and 
responsibilities, and the law determines the relationship 
between the units and the central government, as well as 
their responsibilities, financial income and the 
supervision of their work; the law determines how their 
presidents are selected or elected as well as the latter’s’ 
responsibilities and those of the heads of the 
departments; the local administrative units have councils 
elected by general, secret, direct and egalitarian 
elections.”  
Regarding the election mechanisms, these had been 
10 قافلآاو عقاولا نيب ايروس يف ةيلحملا ةرادلإا, Damascus Center for Research 
and Studies website: https://goo.gl/7gYfLC, date of publication July 5, 
2017, last accessed October 18, 2018 
11 Gharibah, M. 2018, Local Elections in Post-Conflict Syria, Conflict 
Research Programme, London School of Economics and Political Science: 
https://goo.gl/dd31Av, date of publication December 2018, last accessed 
December 2018. 
12 The entire text of the law can be found on the Discover Syria website: 
http://www.discover-syria.com/news/12028 
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identified in the General Election Law, specifically Law 
5/2014.13 It is relevant here to look at some articles within 
this law as laid out below:  
- The local councils are elected according to 
constituencies whose number is based on Syria’s 
administrative divisions. Each area elects a certain 
number of candidates according to the number of 
seats allocated to the area in question. The Minister 
of Local Administration and Environment sets the 
number of constituencies for the councils of the 
provinces, centres of the provinces, and cities whose 
populations exceed 100,000. Meanwhile, all other 
cities and administrative units [in one province] are 
considered one constituency. The number of 
members in the councils of the provinces and other 
administrative units is set by the Minister of Local 
Administration according to the percentages set in 
the Local Administration Law. Meanwhile, the seats 
in the constituencies allocated to the province-level 
councils, and in the constituencies per city, are 
distributed according to a decision by the governor.   
- The local administrative units are made up of 
representatives of sector A, which is made up of 
agriculturalists and workers, and of sector B, which 
is made up of other groups in society. The first sector 
should make up at least 50% of the local council 
membership, and it is the Minister of Local 
Administration who decides the number of members 
                                                     
13 The entire text of the law can be found on the SANA website: 
https://www.sana.sy/?p=342119 
14 Articles 24, 25, 26 of General Election Law 5 
15 Articles 8 and 10 of General Election Law 5 
16 Article 3 of General Election Law 5 
set per sector according to each constituency.14 
- The elections are overseen by the Higher Judicial 
Committee for Elections made up of seven members 
known as the Higher Judicial Council,15 with help 
from other bodies. These include the Branch 
Committee, which sets the polling stations and 
oversees the results process; the Nomination 
Committee, which oversees the acceptance and 
vetting of nomination requests; and the Election 
Centre Committee, which runs the polling stations 
and the voting process.  
- Syrian citizens have the right to vote in general, 
secret, direct and egalitarian elections, in a free and 
personal vote, and this right cannot be delegated to 
a third party.16 
- Every citizen has the right to apply to move his polling 
area, namely the area in which he or she votes – on 
the condition that his residency for a period of over 
two years is proven.17 
- Candidates who obtain the highest portion of the 
vote after it is counted in all constituencies are 
declared winners.18 
- State media outlets and newspapers are able to 
monitor the processes of voting and vote count.19  
- The approved sources to fund election campaigns 
are the candidates’ own financial contributions and 
financial support from political parties.20 In practice, 
17 Article 59 of General Election Law 5 
18 Article 77 of General Election Law 5 
19 Article 16 of General Election Law 5  
20 Article 54 of General Election Law 5 
Image 1 - Campaign posters in a square in Damascus. Credit: Myriam Youssef 
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between the holding of the 2011 council elections 
and the new elections in 2018, Syrians in 
government-controlled areas did not experience 
many of these changes on the local administrative 
level in real terms. The elections were never 
satisfactorily transparent, the local councils did not 
fulfil their role and the decentralisation which was 
demanded and which was promised in Law 107 did 
not become a reality. Rather, these councils merely 
remained a front for central power, which continued 
to govern in all areas. Likewise, the mechanisms for 
appointing governors continued as before, through a 
decree from the President of the Republic, and with a 
clear and significant link to the Ba‘ath Party and 
security forces. The governor continued to enjoy 
absolute authority regardless of the elected councils 
as well as immunity from general accountability and 
judicial prosecution; this was because the authority 
to prosecute and put on trial the governor rests solely 
with the High Judicial Council21 which is itself 
headed by the President of the Republic, and the 
governor is not able to be referred to the Council 
except through a decree issued by the President. In 
other words, the President of the Republic is the only 
person able to appoint the governors, and the only 
person able to refer them to a judicial institution, 
which was itself headed by the President.  
As for the transfer of roles and authorities from the centre 
to local units, this was linked to the setting and 
implementation of the National Decentralisation Plan by 
the High Council of Local Administration during the first 
year and a half of the law’s issuance. The idea behind this 
plan was to outline a detailed vision for the devolution of 
power from a number of ministries and central 
institutions to the elected local councils. In reality, this 
High Council was not formed, such a national plan did not 
materialise, and the scheme remained ink on paper.22 
Consequently, new powers were not devolved to the local 
councils, and the situation remained unchanged, and as it 
had been outlined in Law 15/1971. Within this context, the 
newspaper al-Ayam al-Suriya (or al-Ayam), published from 
Damascus, quoted public and economic affairs expert 
Samer Abu ‘Ammar in that Law 107 and the concept of 
decentralisation was never truly put into practice, and that 
authority remained with central power, the spectre of 
which hung over the local council elections.23 It did not 
seem that the government could implement 
                                                     
21 Article 56 of Law 107 
22 ةبولطملا طورشلا ،لأملا ىلع, Ministry of Local Administration and 
Environment website: http://www.mola.gov.sy/mola/index.php/2018-04-
decentralisation in real terms, in fear of weakening or 
losing authority over the whole of Syria – particularly 
considering the conflict, and of the opposition control 
over swathes of the country.  
 
 The President of the Republic is the only 
person able to appoint the governors, and the 
only person able to refer them to a judicial 
institution, which was itself headed by the 
President.   
It should be recognised that Law 107 had from the start 
created a shared space to a significant extent between 
the different areas controlled by various sides of the 
conflict in Syria, primarily government-controlled areas, 
opposition-controlled areas, and the Syrian Democratic 
Forces (SDF) controlled areas in northeast Syria. This law 
gained consensus during the Geneva Peace talks 
whereby the agreement to decentralise formed part of 
these negotiations. It was likewise accepted by the 
opposition because of the delivery of greater authority to 
the local councils. The Syrian Interim Government 
published an implementing regulation for Law 107, 
applied by many of the local councils in the opposition 
areas, with some amendments to the original wording. As 
for the SDF-controlled areas in northeast Syria, they also 
accepted it despite a core difference in relation to the 
army and security forces which, according to Law 107, 
remain under central control, contradicting the concept of 
self-administered autonomy which requires 
independence in this area.  
 
 Law 107 had from the start created a 
shared space to a significant extent between 
the different areas controlled by various sides 
of the conflict in Syria, primarily government-
controlled areas, opposition-controlled areas, 
and the Kurdish Self-Administered area.  
 
This section has gone into the most important legal 
articles pertaining to local administration and their 
election in Syria. In the second part, we will shed light on 
the candidates from the 2018 election, from the mode 
19-13-25-40/item/6821-2018-09-02-10-48-45, date of publication 
September 2, 2018, last accessed October 10, 2018 
23 باوبلأا ىلع ةيلحملا ةرادلإا تاباختنا, al-Ayam website: https://goo.gl/BB9bsg, 
date of publication July 22, 2018, last accessed October 22, 2018 
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and mechanisms of their nomination to the election 
campaigns and manifestos in the different provinces of 
Syria. We will look at government-controlled areas, 
opposition-controlled areas, those in the SDF-controlled 
areas in northeast Syria, and those which the government 
regained from 2016 on. We will study a sample of 
candidates: those with particular partisan leanings and 
independents; men and women; those who chose not to 
put themselves up for nomination; and those who 
withdrew following their nomination.  
3 Candidates, Nomination 
Mechanisms and Election Campaigns 
On July 26, 2018, the Ministry of Local Administration 
started receiving nomination requests from those who 
wished to join the local election race.24 The deadline for 
this was August 1, 2018, and by that date, the number of 
candidates was 41,482 for a total of 18,478 seats; this is 
compared to 2011, in the previous round of elections, 
when there were 17,588 seats competed for by 42,889 
candidates.25 The increase in seats was the result of 
certain villages being recognised as townships following 
their population increase.  
However, the number of candidates per number of seats 
had in fact reduced, from 3.3 in 2007 to 2.4 in 2011 to 2.2 
in 2018, an indication of the reduction in the number of 
candidates despite the increase in the number of seats 
(see table 1).  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                     
24 ةيلحملا سلاجملا ةرادإ ةيوضعل حشرتلا طورش, Ministry of Local Administration 
and Environment website:  http://www.mola.gov.sy/mola/index.php/2018-
04-19-13-25-40/item/6623-2018-07-26-11-33-24, date of publication July 
26, 2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
25 ةيلحملا ةرادلإا سلاجم تاباختنا, General Organization of Radio and TV 
website: http://www.ortas.gov.sy/index.php?p=21&id=84056, date of 
publication October 8, 2011, last accessed October 18, 2018  
In comparing the number of candidates to the number of 
seats using figures from the Ministry of Local 
Administration, the ratio can be seen to plummet to less 
than one in some provinces, such as in Deir Ezzor. This is 
a further indication of the decline in candidate numbers, 
in comparison with the seats being competed for. It 
should be noted that there is a lack of clear and precise 
data for these figures, with regard to the election in 
question. The figures are not easily accessible on the 
Ministry’s website, and there are several errors, including 
the publishing of multiple figures inconsistently for 
particular areas. Moreover, in one-on-one meetings, 
journalists described their inability to obtain clear and 
precise data on the candidate numbers and their 
distribution per province, and on the numbers of female 
and male candidates. This indicates a lack of real 
engagement in these elections on the part of the Syrian 
government and their treatment of them as nothing more 
than a superficial exercise.  
 
3.1 Who Are the Candidates?  
As mentioned above, there were over 41,000 candidates 
to fill the local administration seats in the different 
provinces of Syria, demonstrating the number of requests 
accepted from among over 49,000 requests that the High 
Judicial Committee announced they received by the 
nomination deadline.26 The majority (70%) were 
candidates from the Ba‘ath Party and their allies, most 
prominently the Communist Party and the Syrian Socialist 
National Party, while the remainder (30%) were 
independent candidates.27 The candidates were divided 
into two groups: Group A, for farmers and workers, and 
Group B, for all other sectors.  
 
 I will not be putting myself up for election, 
and I will not be part of the results-fixing 
process, and likewise I will not participate in 
painting a rosy picture of the current Syrian 
government. What elections are we talking 
about when the war has not yet ended? 28  
 
26 حيشرت بلط فلأ 49 نم رثكأ ةيلحملا ةرادلإا تاباختنا, Ba‘ath Media website: 
https://goo.gl/AFgyaE, date of publication August 2, 2018, last accessed 
October 18, 2018  
27 ةمداقلا ةيلحملا سلاجملا يف اهمئاوق ةصح ددحت ثعبلا ةدايق, Snack Syrian website: 
https: //goo.gl/teKWqP, date of publication August 30, 2018, last 
accessed October 12, 2018  
28 From an interview with an activist working on feminist and legal issues 
in Damascus 
Electoral 
Term 
No. of 
Candidates 
No. of 
Seats
Ratio of No. 
of 
Candidates/ 
Number of 
Seats 
2018 41482 18478 2.24 
2011 42889 17588 2.43 
2007 32058 9697 3.30  
Table 1 - Number of candidates and seats in the last 
three local elections in Syria, Source: Ministry of Local 
Administration and Environment. 
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The deadline for accepting nomination requests was 
extended by a few hours to midnight on August 1, 2018. 
Explanations as to why this took place differ. According 
to Syrian state media, the deadline was extended because 
of “the huge turnout of candidates to submit their 
requests to the province-level Nomination Committees,”29 
while activists and journalists cite the reason as being the 
decrease in the number of nomination requests and the 
inclusion of additional names by the Ba‘ath Party.  
In the first three days of the nomination process, the 
number of submissions did not exceed 1800,30 and by 
July 31 it was up to 10,000.31 In one day, the number 
jumped to over 40,000 candidates, as was confirmed by 
the head of the High Judicial Committee for Elections in 
a statement to al-Watan newspaper, in which it was 
confirmed that “the last day of nomination witnessed a 
huge turnout.”32 In the same context, al-Ayam pointed out 
that “turnout on the first day of nomination was low in 
Homs province, with a number of people in the local 
councils spreading news and rumours that the lists which 
would win in the election had already been set and that it 
would be their names in these lists. This reflects badly on 
the nomination process, and will certainly be detrimental 
to the elections in terms of the voter turnout, with the 
prevailing atmosphere being one of boycott or lack of 
active participation in the election.”33 The website Snack 
Syrian further highlighted this, drawing attention to 
instructions from the Ba‘ath Party regional leadership to 
its officers in Syria to put themselves up for nomination 
in the last days before the deadline, with the resulting 
increase in the number of candidates and perception that 
Syrian turnout and interest in the elections was high.34  
Other media reports spoke about the inclusion of 
unqualified candidates or those living outside of Syria, as 
was the case in Qudsaya in Rural Damascus35 and in 
Hama.36 They also talked about the presence of some 
candidates who were subject to judicial charges, 
including the former mayor of Jaramana in Rural 
Damascus,37 and candidates from pro-regime militias.38 
                                                     
29 ةيلحملا ةرادلإا سلاجم تاباختنلا حيشرتلا تابلط لوبق ديدمت, Tishreen News 
website: http://tishreen.news.sy/?p=199716, date of publication August 1, 
2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
30 ىلولأا ةثلاثلا مايلأا يف تاباختنلال حشرت بلط 1800, al-Watan website: 
http://alwatan.sy/archives/160452, date of publication July 29, 2018, last 
accessed October 18, 2018   
31 حشرتلا باب قلاغإ نم دحاو موي لبق ةيلحملا ةرادلإا تاباختنلا حشرم فلاآ ةرشع طقف, 
Damas Post website: https://goo.gl/wXJYnC, date of publication July 31, 
2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
32 ةيلحملا تاباختنلال حشرت بلط فلأ 46, al-Watan website: 
http://alwatan.sy/archives/161287, date of publication August 2, 2018, 
last accessed October 18, 2018  
33مايلأا ةديرج عقوم ىلع ،ةيلحملا ةرادلإا تاباختنا لبق ام ءاوجأ ءارقتسا لصاوت مايلأا, al-
Ayam website: https://goo.gl/eT8dCS, date of publication July 29, 2018, 
last accessed October 18, 2018  
This was among attempts to raise the number of 
candidates and participants in the elections despite the 
fact that some were not eligible to run.  
While the election law allows for candidates as young as 
25, the participation of young people in the race remained 
low. Perhaps the most significant reason for this was that 
many young men between the ages of 25 and 50 had left 
the country to avoid military service, whether conscription 
or reserve. Others, meanwhile, chose to stay at home – 
far from public life – in order to avoid being recruited to 
military service at military or security checkpoints, 
permanent and temporary, which are scattered across the 
government-controlled areas. Moreover, 25 is roughly the 
age at which students’ complete university, and therefore 
the age at which the postponing of military service is no 
longer an option. There are no official statistics available 
for the age of the candidates, yet field-level observations 
suggested a low representation of young candidates 
compared to those of 40 and above.  
 
3.1.1 Party Candidates 
The norm in Syria was that the names of allied candidates 
for the local and parliamentary elections were released 
within electoral lists. While the Progressive National Front 
set what was usually called “The Front List,” during the 
elections in question the name was changed to “The 
National Unity List”. Often these lists would be closed 
lists, permitting voters to choose the list as a whole and 
not to specify names within it or add other names. At 
other times, voters would be able to add names to a 
particular list in empty boxes which had not been filled in 
beforehand. Syrians were used to the National 
Progressive lists coming top in any elections whether 
parliamentary or local, with the resulting impression that 
the elections were merely for show.  
The elections in question sustained the norm of closed 
candidate lists limited to National Unity candidates, while 
other lists contained independent candidates or allowed 
you to add other names. Within the National Unity lists 
34 سيرعلا بايغب يموق ينطو سرع ةيلحملا ةرادلإا تاباختنا, Snack Syrian website: 
https://goo.gl/H57TSZ, date of publication September 1, 2018, October 
18, 2018  
35 ايسدق ةيدلب سلجم تاباختنلا ةينطولا ةهبجلا ةمئاق يف نولهؤم ريغو نوفوقوم, Sham 
Times website: https://goo.gl/VDWPLJ, date of publication September 
2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
36  دحلأا ةيلحملا تارادلإا سلاجم تاباختنا عارتقا قيدانص ىلإ اهؤانبأو رصتنت ايروس
لبقملا, al-Watan website: http://alwatan.sy/archives/166072, date of 
publication September 13, 2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
37 نيحشرملا نوفرعي لا انامرج وبخان تيوصتلا ىلع تاعاس لبق,  Snack Syrian 
website https://goo.gl/GP7JZx, date of publication September 15, 2018, 
last accessed October 18, 2018 
38 ةيلحملا ةرادلإا تاباختنلا حشرم رقابلا ءاول دئاق, Snack Syrian website: 
https://goo.gl/Vyq5hR, date of publication September 6, 2018, last 
accessed October 18, 2018 
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themselves, Ba‘ath Party candidates had the lion’s share. 
As Snack Syrian reported, these lists were closed and the 
number of seats given by the Ba‘ath Party to the parties 
of the National Progressive Front was minimal.39 There 
were also some lists which were incomplete up to a day 
before the elections owing to the lack of sufficient 
independent candidates.40 
 
 These problems [in the election process] 
call for civil society to act as a safety valve and 
to monitor what happens down the line. 41  
 
In terms of Ba‘ath Party lists, it is important to look at the 
law issued by the regional leadership of the party on 
August 15, 2018, which defined the standards by which 
candidates should be chosen for local administration 
within the lists. Among these were their sense of national 
belonging – by which is meant their position on the 
conflict and its different sides in Syria – as well as 
honesty, sincerity and integrity. It was effectively a signal 
to exclude any candidate opposed to the regime from 
nomination and to put an end to their electoral ambitions. 
The regional leadership sent a copy of this decision to the 
Ministry of Local Administration, in an indication of the 
continued authority of the Ba‘ath Party.42  
 
 Nomination mechanisms are still 
subject to corruption and bribery, so 
that he who pays the most is able to get 
onto the Progressive National Front 
lists, in expectation of rewards directly 
after the elections.  
 
In terms of the parties which were included alongside the 
Ba‘ath Party in the National Unity lists, according to 
                                                     
39 هنذأ لمجلا نم اولان ةأرملاو ةهبجلا بازحأ ،ةيقذلالا ةمئاق نلعي ثعبلا, Snack Syrian 
website: https://goog.gl/aAAbXZ , date of publication 9 September, 2018, 
last accessed, 18 October 2018   
40 نيحشرملا نوفرعي لا انامرج وبخان تيوصتلا ىلع تاعاس لبق, Snack Syrian 
website: https://goo.gl/GP7JZx, date of publication September 15, 2018, 
last accessed October 18, 2018 
41 يفاضإ يباجيإ ديصرو يفاعتلا ىلع ليلد تاباختنلاا :لخادلا ةضراعم, al-Watan 
website: http://alwatan.sy/archives/159527, date of publication July 22, 
2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
42  ىلإ اهلسرتو ةيلحملا سلاجملا ءاضعأ رايتخلا ًاسسأ عضت ثعبلا ةدايق روتسدلا ةزواجتم
ةيلحملا ةرادلإا ريزو, Snack Syrian website: https://goo.gl/yZe8U2, date of 
publication August 23, 2018, last accessed October 11, 2018  
official media reports, most were relatively satisfied with 
their representation in these lists. This is what was 
reported by al-Watan, which quoted the General Secretary 
of the United Syrian Communist Party, Hanin Nimr; the 
General Secretary of the Arab Socialist Union Party, 
Safwan Qudsi; the General Secretary of the Covenant 
Party Ghassan Othman; and the President of the Political 
Office of the Syrian Socialist National Party included in 
the Front, Safwan Salman.43 However, one-to-one 
interviews with candidates from these parties did not 
reveal this same sense of contentment. One of the 
members of the Syrian Socialist National Party spoke 
furiously about “nomination mechanisms are still subject 
to corruption and bribery so that he who pays the most is 
able to get onto the Progressive National Front lists, in 
expectation of rewards directly after the elections.” 
Meanwhile, a member of the Communist Party pointed to 
“the continuation of favouritism and clientelism in the 
nomination process disqualified many whose ambitions 
in joining the local councils are really to serve their 
community.”44 
It is relevant to look at the stances of some of the players 
considered to be internal opposition, parties outside of 
the National Progressive Front, and active members of 
civil society within the government-controlled areas. It 
was these stances which were the focus of significant 
local state media coverage, as they aimed to portray the 
local elections as a political action taking place in a 
healthy democratic climate. There was, so it went, clear 
civil society participation and political pluralism, 
alongside the furtherance of political stability, and a 
readiness for these elections which were only delayed in 
their previous term because of the “war on terrorism”.  
The first of these stances were recorded by the Syrian 
Youth Party, led by Berwin Ibrahim, which announced its 
entry into the electoral process in August.45 But it did not 
take long before the party had withdrawn, with its 
chairwoman announcing she would send a letter to the 
President opposing the election on the grounds that it 
was nothing more than an appointment process.46 The 
chairwoman of the Suriya al-Watan Party Majd Niyazi, in 
43  دحلأا ةيلحملا تارادلإا سلاجم تاباختنا عارتقا قيدانص ىلإ اهؤانبأو رصتنت ايروس
لبقملا, al-Watan website :http://alwatan.sy/archives/166072, date of 
publication September 13, 2018, last accessed October 18, 2018 
44 Personal interviews for report preparation with members of the Front’s 
parties in Damascus  
45 ثعبلا بزح تاسرامم فقوت ةيقيقح تاباختنلا علطتت ةديدجلا بازحلأا, Snack Syrian 
website: https://goo.gl/6n56Rq, date of publication August 22, 2018, last 
accessed October 18, 2018  
46 ةيروسلا ةسائرلا ىلإ ضراعم بزح ةسيئر نم ةلاسر ،تاباختنلاا دعب, Snack Syrian 
website: https://goo.gl/aS7VXW, date of publication September 17, 2018, 
last accessed October 18, 2018  
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turn, confirmed that she was not interested in following 
the election since as far as she was concerned it was 
merely celebratory posturing with no real impact.47  
 
 The continuation of favouritism and 
clientelism in the nomination process 
disqualified many whose ambitions in 
joining the local councils are really to 
serve their community.48  
 
Meanwhile, some figures considered by local state media 
as critical voices had different views. Diana Jabbour, 
journalist and president of the board of the cultural 
organisation ‘Ta Mabsouta’ said that “lack of participation 
in the public sphere has been one of the issues at the root 
of the crisis; by getting involved with the experiment [of 
local elections] we can positively shape ourselves and our 
country,” as reported by al-Watan newspaper, published in 
Damascus. The paper also quoted Anas Joudeh, the 
President of the Nation Building Movement, as saying that 
the timing of the elections was a “sign of recovery,” while 
indicating that there were still serious problems in the 
election process. These were, he said, illustrated by “the 
dominance of traditional powers and the ability of the 
Ba‘ath Party to control the elections, the inclusion of 
closed lists, and corruption allied with the administrations 
in areas of reconstruction and upcoming investments. 
These problems call for civil society to act as a safety 
valve and to monitor what happens down the line.”49  
 
 
 
                                                     
47 ةيروسلا ةسائرلا ىلإ ضراعم بزح ةسيئر نم ةلاسر ،تاباختنلاا دعب, Snack Syrian 
website: https://goo.gl/aS7VXW, date of publication September 17, 2018, 
last accessed October 18, 2018  
48 Personal interviews for report preparation with members of the Front’s 
parties in Damascus  
49 يفاضإ يباجيإ ديصرو يفاعتلا ىلع ليلد تاباختنلاا :لخادلا ةضراعم, al-Watan 
website: http://alwatan.sy/archives/159527, date of publication July 22, 
2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
50 Article 2 of Law 107: This law aims to: 
Establish Administrative Units capable of planning, executing, and 
applying the development plans pertaining to local society and 
implementing related projects effectively and efficiently, by modifying the 
levels of the Administrative Units and determining their local structure in 
line with their basic purpose; add a number of quality jobs within them; 
make the Administrative Units at every level directly responsible for 
services, the economy, culture, and all affairs which concern citizens 
within these units. The role of the central authorities shall be limited to 
3.1.2 Independent Candidates  
This section will now turn to the independent candidates. 
On the basis of field observations and interviews, we can 
classify them within the following groups:  
- Candidates which believed they had the capacity to 
effect change. These were mostly those who in the 
preceding years had entered civil work of some kind, 
including in relief, psychological support, and 
education. These were individual cases, however, 
which could not be grouped into one category and 
were unable really to penetrate the National Unity 
lists or even the lists of other independent 
candidates. In this context, one of the candidates 
said, “I am full of hope that I can succeed and 
implement my manifesto, which includes serving the 
community and consolidating the role of civil society. 
Nevertheless, I cannot hide my fear that we, as 
independent candidates, will not be allowed to take 
any effective decisions to oppose the National 
Progressive Front candidates and their continued 
control in all areas of the state.” 
-  Law 107 gives local councils 
powers to make economic, financial 
and constructional investments 
which give companies and 
businessmen a future foothold for 
any expected investments and 
reconstruction.  
- Businessmen or those backed by businessmen or 
companies; this is where the expected economic 
gains post-election become pertinent. Local 
Administration Law 107 gives local councils powers 
to make economic, financial and constructional 
investments,50 which give companies and 
planning, enactment, organization, and supply of modern technical 
methods and implementing major projects which the Administrative Units 
are unable to implement. 
Implement the decentralization of powers and responsibilities and 
concentrate them in the hands of the people from different social 
statuses, in accordance with the principle of democracy which posits the 
people as the source of all authority, through expansion, clear definition 
and non-duplication of the powers and authorities of the Administrative 
Unit Councils in order to enable them to perform their functions and duties 
in developing the Administrative Unit economically, socially, culturally and 
structurally. 
Article 34 of Law 107: The Governorate Council may approve the funding 
of investment development projects with a yield not exceeding 25 percent 
of the independent budget in the interest of the Governorate. This Article 
shall be considered as an amendment of the methods of expenditure of 
the independent budget. 
Article 60 of Law 107: The City, Town or Township Council shall develop 
plans and follow up their implementation to guarantee equitable and 
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businessmen a future foothold for any expected 
investments and reconstruction.  Candidates who 
are driven by a particular sectarian or geographical 
affiliation, such as certain candidates from old 
Damascus neighbourhoods, or those backed or paid 
to put themselves up for nomination seeking certain 
gains for their area or neighbourhood, with this, in 
turn, most likely being sectarian-driven. During an 
interview, a resident of Shaghour spoke about “the 
nomination of people wholly unqualified to represent 
Shaghour in the local councils along with 
neighbouring areas such as al-Ameen and al-
Qaymariyya. Some have not even completed their 
secondary education, but they were backed for 
nomination by residents and dignitaries of these 
areas, with the aim of representing certain sects in 
the council and ensuring that the voices of 
individuals from these sects reach leadership.” 
Within this context and in a rare occurrence, it was 
reported by Snack Syrian that independent candidates in 
Tartus had formed an electoral alliance in a list named 
“Loyalty to Tartus.” This list entered the race against the 
                                                     
sustainable development in the Administrative Unit. In order to do so it 
may follow up and approve organizational schemes in accordance with 
laws and regulations.  
51 يروس كانس عقوم ىلع ،تاباختنلاا ضوخل ًافلاحت نولكشي سوطرط يف نولقتسم, 
Snack Syrian website: https://goo.gl/bzHc41, date of publication 
September 15, 2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
52 ‘Loyalty to Tartus’ list victory announced in local elections on local 
Facebook page: 
https://m.facebook.com/story.php?story_fbid=241783323152966&id=124
610534870246 
53 ةيلحملا ةرادلإا تاباختنا نم ةلمجلاب تاباحسنا ةكسحلا, Snack Syrian website 
https://goo.gl/q9ZzV2, date of publication September 5, 2018, last 
accessed October 18, 2018   
National Unity list, even though the number of those in the 
alliance was small compared to the number of available 
seats for Tartus city council (6 versus 27).51 The list was 
later declared victorious in the elections.52  
 
3.1.3 Withdrawals and Lack of Nomination  
Many of those who put themselves up for nomination 
withdrew during the electoral process. Some of these 
withdrawals were collective, such as in al-Hasakah and 
Qamishli, where over 100 candidates withdrew against 
the backdrop of a wave of arrests, which included the 
detention of candidates. These arrests were made by the 
security forces of the SDF-controlled areas, which refused 
to hold elections for the Syrian government in areas 
where they held power.53 News outlets reported frequent 
withdrawals of As-Suwayda branch54 candidates from the 
National Syrian Socialist Party; this was, it was reported, 
“a response to the dismissal and marginalisation by the 
Ba‘ath Party’s As-Suwayda branches of allied parties and 
national figures from the area in general, and of the Syrian 
Socialist National Party in particular.”55 This was denied 
by the as-Suwayda branches the next day.56 
54 According to the constitution of the Syrian Socialist National Party and 
its laws, the party is divided into administrative areas according to decrees 
issued by the president of the party, called ‘Branches’ or ‘تايذفنم’ 
55  ةرادلإا تاباختنا نم يعامتجلاا يموقلا يروسلا بزحلا يحشرم باحسنا نايب نم
ءاديوسلا ةظفاحم يف ةيلحملا, as-Suwayda News Network website: 
https://goo.gl/byzpuk, date of publication September 11, 2018, last 
accessed October 7, 2018  
56 تاباختنلاا نم بحسني يوهبج بزح ةيخيرات ةقباس يف, Snack Syrian website: 
https://goo.gl/HJeDhY, date of publication September 11, 2018, last 
accessed October 18, 2018  
ءاديوسلا ةظفاحم يف بزحلا يحشرم باحسنا يفني يعامتجلاا يموقلا يروسلا بزحلا, as-
Suwayda News Network Website: 
https://www.swaidasnn.com/2018/09/87698-12.html, date of publication 
September 12, 2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
Image 2 - Female candidate poster in the city of Damascus. Credit: Myriam Youssef 
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Additionally, many individual withdrawals were observed 
during the days before the election. Reasons cited 
included “the persistence of the same old mentalities, in 
particular, those of Ba‘ath Party leaders and officials in 
their control of the elections,” and the “loss of hope in the 
capability to penetrate the Ba‘ath Party lists or implement 
any change post-election.”57 In one of the interviews, a 
candidate who had withdrawn her nomination from 
Damascus city said, “I wanted to nominate myself as an 
independent candidate in order to serve my community, 
but I was not able to confront the blocs in the National 
Unity lists. A few days after submitting my nomination 
request, I decided to withdraw it to avoid any potential 
problems.” 
Meanwhile, some of those working in the public sphere 
were reluctant or unwilling to nominate themselves. 
Reasons for this include the following:58 
- The loss of hope in a change of mentality of the 
Ba‘ath Party and the belief that the results were 
preordained. One interviewee said: “Yes I am 
interested in change and I believe that the Local 
Administration Law 107 represents a significant 
chance to develop administrative work in Syria. I also 
believe that I am able to implement some changes in 
my area of Qalamoun in Rural Damascus. However, I 
refuse to nominate myself given the current 
conditions and with the continuation of the Ba‘ath 
Party control of the elections and other areas of 
governance. I would prefer to wait until the next 
electoral term perhaps, with the hope of far-reaching 
changes in this regard.” 
- Nominating oneself as an independent candidate 
requires a significant budget to cover the costs of the 
election campaign and also the ability to oppose the 
National Front lists which receive significant support 
predominantly from the Ba‘ath Party.  
- A disinclination to get drawn in politics at the current 
time, given the presence of the existing government 
and without a political solution to the Syrian conflict 
having been reached. In this context, an active 
member in civil society and Damascus resident 
expressed her interest in the local elections, and at 
the same time stated her refusal to nominate herself 
                                                     
57 Interviews with a number of people who put themselves up for 
nomination and later withdrew from the electoral process 
58 Interviews with a number of people concerned with public affairs in 
Damascus  
59 ةيلحملا ةرادلإا تاباختنا لبق ام ءاوجأ ءارقتسا لصاوت مايلأا, Al-Ayam website: 
https://goo.gl/eT8dCS, date of publication July 29, 2018, last accessed 
October 18, 2018  
when no conclusive political solution had been 
reached: “I will not have my name be associated with 
the current government, which has itself contributed 
in one way or another to the continuation of the 
bloody conflict in the country. I am not particularly 
optimistic about the prospect of a change of the 
status quo anytime soon, so I would prefer to 
continue my civil society work, far removed from any 
governmental or political affiliation.” 
Within this context, al-Ayam quoted a member of the 
Reconciliation Committees in Rural Damascus: “In our 
district, we will not be putting ourselves up for nomination 
for several reasons. Most significantly, the current mayor 
made it clear that he will serve another term before the 
nomination process had even started. We are not 
millionaires, and will not, therefore, have the capacity to 
compete.”59 
Snack Syrian likewise quoted a number of media figures 
who said they would be boycotting the elections 
completely, with some of them pulling out of the race, 
following the Ba‘ath Party’s announcement of the 
National Unity lists with which they were affiliated. 
Among the reasons for this was the inclusion of closed 
lists without the possibility of adding new names, the 
rejection of nomination requests, and the continuation of 
the ‘who-you-know’ attitude governing the process.60 
The Lebanese newspaper al-Akhbar also addressed this 
issue; they referenced “nominees receiving 
congratulations as soon as their names were announced 
on the National Unity lists, which included the Ba‘ath Party 
nominees and those from allied parties.”61 
 
3.1.4 Female Candidates  
Female representation in the nomination process 
appeared to be relatively low. This is a conclusion that 
can be drawn from looking at electoral lists and the 
candidate numbers published online by the Ministry of 
Local Administration, given the lack of complete data on 
the number of female candidates from either the Ministry 
or the Higher Judicial Committee for Elections.62 
Significantly, neither Local Administration Law 107 nor 
General Election Law 5 contains any indication about 
60 ءاضيب ةقرو عضنس :تاباختنلاا راسم نودقتني نويفحص, Snack Syrian website 
https://goo.gl/wm1vAJ, date of publication September 11, 2018, last 
accessed October 18, 2018  
61 يبعش دوربو يسايس راكتحا ةيلحملا ةرادلإا تانييعت, al-Akhbar website: https://al-
akhbar.com/Syria/257898, date of publication September 14, 2018, last 
accessed October 12, 2018  
62 ةطلسلا هتسرك يعمتجم عقاول ساكعنا تايروسلا تاحشرملا ددع ضافخنا, Snack 
Syrian website: https://goo.gl/n3UMro, date of publication August 21, 
2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
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assigning a specific portion of seats, or quota, for women.   
One female candidate from as-Suwayda spoke in an 
interview about her motivations for joining the race and 
her role in “changing the stereotype about women’s ability 
to enter into politics and public life – a woman’s role 
should not be confined to domestic work or to particular 
professions, as if she is inferior to others. I want to prove 
that women are capable of working in any profession, and 
to a high standard of work. I want to move on from this 
idea of quotas, with women filling a certain number of 
seats regardless of ability.” During another interview, a 
female candidate from al-Qalamoun expressed her wish 
to become a decision maker side by side with men and 
expressed her hope that she would be able, in cooperation 
with her male colleagues, to put forward a number of 
services in her area.  
The following is a list of examples about the 
representation of female participation in the elections:63 
- One of the female candidates from Aleppo stated to 
al-Ayam that female representation in the Aleppo 
lists was no more than 3%, with just one woman from 
the whole of Rural Aleppo in these lists.64 
- The proportion of female candidates in Hama was 
7.8% and in Daraa 7.4%.  
- The lists for Latakia province – the district 
constituency – was devoid of any female 
representation. Meanwhile, in the Latakia city list, 7 
seats out of 50, or 14%, were occupied by women.65 
- Jabla lists: 5 women out of a total of 52 candidates, 
9.6%.  
- Shahba lists in as-Suwayda province: 5 women out of 
a total of 219 candidates, 2.3% 
- Qalamoun lists: 43 women out of a total of 328 
candidates, 12.8%  
- Constituency Two of Damascus: 2 women out of a 
total of 16 candidates, 12.5% 
- The constituency of Qudsaya in Rural Damascus, 
National Unity list: 2 female candidates out of a total 
of 7 candidates, 28.6% 
- The council of the city of Qudsaya Suburb in Rural 
Damascus, National Unity list: 5 women out of a total 
of 26 candidates, 19% 
                                                     
63 These figures were gathered from: different media reports, data from 
the Ministry of Local Administration and Environment, data from the High 
Council for Elections, and through signs put up on main streets  
64 قيبطتلا وأ ةينهذلا يف رييغت لا ةيلحملا ةرادلإا سلاجم تاباختنا, al-Ayam website: 
https://goo.gl/96xL33, date of publication September 9, 2018, last 
accessed October 18, 2018 
- Constituency Five of Damascus Province: no women 
among 30 candidates.  
Against this backdrop, a number of officials from the 
Ministry of Local Administration indicated in 
conversations with local journalists that female 
participation reached an estimated 15% in all lists. 
However, the aforementioned examples show that the 
highest estimate would not exceed 8%, significantly lower 
than the official announcements by the Ministry to media 
outlets. This shows how the Syrian government worked to 
propagate a certain public image – one in which women 
were indeed participating in the country’s political 
process. This moreover served to strengthen the 
comparisons made by state media with the opposition-
controlled areas, where women are rarely seen in public 
life as a result of hard-line Islamic rule.  
 
3.2 Electoral Campaigns and Manifestos 
The manifestos of most of the candidates were unclear. 
Most of the National Unity candidates either did not have 
manifestos or did not broadcast them publicly. Other 
candidates, most of them independent and not part of the 
Unity list, took care to broadcast their manifestos on 
social media.66 
 
The majority of eligible voters had no 
idea about any of the candidates’ 
manifestos.  
 
Some of the manifestos observed were simply slogans, 
without clear and tangible steps laid out. Among these 
were: “Activating our local council out of respect for the 
martyrs and the sacrifices of the Syrian army”; “Respecting 
the principles of the constitution, and equality between all 
citizens in their rights and duties”; and “Local 
administration is our way towards overpowering the 
conspiracy against Syria.” Other manifestos spoke clearly 
about the improvement to local service provision, the 
implementation of a number of developmental programs, 
and the strengthening of the role of civil society. 
65 ةيقذلالا ةمئاق نلعي ثعبلا, Snack Syrian website, Snack Syrian website: 
https://goog.gl/aAAbXZ , date of publication 9 September, 2018, last 
accessed 18 October 2018   
66 Example: Manifesto of Candidate Mayas al-Khoury from Deir Attiya, 
Facebook post: 
https://www.facebook.com/296496841142595/photos/a.301863203939
292/303532330439046/?type=3&theater 
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Through interviews with people living in different 
provinces, it became clear that the majority of eligible 
voters had no idea about any of the candidates’ 
manifestos. They had no idea as to where they might find 
them and had no interest in taking the time to go into 
them, given that the results, as far as they were 
concerned, were already decided. One interviewee 
expressed this as follows: “In the week leading up to the 
election I tried to find a manifesto from any of the 
candidates, but I was totally unsuccessful. How could we 
vote, supposing we wanted to, without knowing who we 
are voting for and why?” 
The election campaigns themselves were also extremely 
modest, limited to a few city centres, and not starting until 
a few days before the election.67 This poses the question 
of how serious these elections were and whether they 
were not simply a posturing exercise for the acquisition 
of specific political and economic gains.  
Indeed, there was still no announcement of the elections 
up to twenty days before polling day, with promotion 
limited to a few pages on social media.68 The campaigns 
started to appear more significantly about a fortnight 
before the vote and continued tentatively until the day of 
the elections themselves.69  
                                                     
67 ةيلحملا ةرادلإا تاباختنلا ةينلاعلإا تلامحلا يف رقف, al-Watan website: 
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27, 2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
A sample of the signs and photographs put up during the 
campaigns, either from the National Unity lists or from 
independent candidates, makes evident that the latter 
were self-funded, and generally modestly. In other cases, 
the funders were friends or family of the candidates, or 
businessmen or companies standing behind the 
nomination for personal gain. As an example, the holding 
company Khayti funded the campaign of candidate Rafiq 
Mohammad, from Salihiya district in Damascus province. 
The company, founded in June 2018, works in the 
industry, agriculture, commerce and real estate among 
other sectors;70 it is possible that the company was 
motivated to finance the campaign because of the 
influence the local administration had over economic 
interests, specifically in the construction sector, as 
detailed above.  
Campaign slogans were varied and included the 
following:  
- The vibrant voice of youth 
- Your vote… Your interest 
- Hand in hand we will build Syria anew 
- We will build it 
- Working for the strengthening of infrastructure 
services 
- Striving for the civil rehabilitation of al-Qadam and al-
Maydan districts 
- To my family and loved ones in you we grow 
- Together for the Jasmine Capital 
- Working to meet the demands of reconstruction and 
urban development  
Electoral tents, meanwhile, were observed in some cities 
and townships. This was one way in which candidates 
could drum up support, by approaching and talking to 
voters, telling them about their manifestoes, and 
petitioning them for their vote. Such tents are typically put 
up in public spaces, with photographs of the candidates 
and their campaign material. Visitors are offered 
refreshments and are invited inside to speak in person 
with the candidates. All tents observed belonged to the 
National Unity lists, with occasional participation from 
independent candidates. On being asked, a candidate 
stated that the tent in which he was campaigning had 
been privately funded by the candidates, and not by any 
69 عارتقلاا دعوم نم ًاموي 12 لبق ةيباختنا ةطفاي لوأ قيلعت ،سايناب, Snack Syrian 
website: https://goo.gl/zTjFK5, date of publication September 5, 2018, last 
accessed October 18, 2018   
70 قشمد فير نم نيرمثتسمل ةيروس ةريل رايلم لامسأرب ةضباق ةكرش سيسأت, al-Iqtisadi 
website: https://goo.gl/s64phu, date of publication June 25, 2018, last 
accessed October 16, 2018  
Image 3- A man takes a break in the shadow of a campaign sign in 
Damascus. Credit: Myriam Youssef 
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party or businessman. A journalist in the same tent said 
that the independent candidates were spending large 
amounts of money to have their photographs mounted in 
the tents as an electioneering technique.  
 
3.3 Reconciliation Areas and Local 
Agreements  
It is important to examine the different areas that had 
been retaken by the Syrian government after years of 
opposition control. These areas are mostly those 
surrounding Damascus in the east, west and south, 
namely Darayya, al-Muadamiya, and the neighbourhoods 
of Barzeh, Qaboun and Tishreen, Eastern Ghouta, Sahel al-
Zabadani, Wadi Barada, al-Tall, Qudsaya and al-Hamah, 
Yalda, Babbila, Beit Sahem, al-Qadam, al-Hajar al-Aswad 
and Yarmouk camp; additionally the districts of eastern 
Aleppo, areas in central and rural Homs in the middle of 
the country, and wide expanses in Daraa in the south of 
the country.  
These are areas which for up to six years were outside 
Syrian government control, and made up the strongholds 
of the armed opposition. They went through periods of 
self-governance, with local councils either appointed or 
elected, most working under the administration of the 
Syrian Interim Government, and the armed factions and 
religious authorities there. They were also subject to 
years of besiegement and military operations of varying 
intensities, as the regime and its allies attempted to take 
back control of these areas.  
Performance of the local councils outside government 
control varied, as did their ability to meet the needs of 
residents, depending on the human and material 
resources afforded to them, and the intensity of the 
military campaigns that they were subject to. Indeed, 
these campaigns affected both their capacity to provide 
services, and the extent of the need for these services in 
the first place. These councils grew with time, and they 
established executive offices and specific apparatus for 
implementing different kinds of projects and services. 
They worked on reforming and expanding their structures, 
their mechanisms for appointing or electing their 
members, and on developing a legal framework for their 
work. Many of these councils held general, direct 
elections, in which members of civil society, armed 
factions and local leaders participated. Among the areas 
where this took place were Douma, Saqba and Zamalka 
in Eastern Ghouta between 2015 and 2016, and these 
                                                     
71 Gharibah, M. 2016. The Perception of Governance: The Experience of 
Local Councils in Opposition-Held Syria. SwissPeace website 
http://www.swisspeace.ch/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/Mediation/Arabic_
councils sought to be more inclusive and transparent by 
consulting the local communities and letting the public 
know about the projects and schemes being 
implemented.71  
 
From August 2016, the Syrian regime was able to 
gradually take back control of the areas which were under 
the rule of armed factions and opposition councils, 
through brutal military campaigns followed by local 
agreements. This started with Darayya in Rural Damascus 
and culminated with Daraa in the south of the country. 
Local agreements were termed reconciliation or 
settlement agreements, and they were carried out 
through bodies known as “Reconciliation Committees” 
made up of prominent figures who held influence and 
connections within the areas in question. They became 
something like middlemen, with armed groups on one 
side, and the governmental negotiation committees on 
the other. They worked under the supervision of the 
Ministry of National Reconciliation Affairs, and the 
Reconciliation Centres set up by Russia following their 
military intervention in Syria at the end of 2015 with the 
aim of reaching a conclusive local reconciliation deal, 
along with its conditions and application mechanisms.  
 
Synthesis_Paper_Peceptions_of_Governance.pdf, date of publication 
January 2016, last accessed October 13, 2018  
Image 4 - A man casts his vote in Arbeen, Ghouta, an area 
previously under opposition control. Source: Social Media 
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 Most people here are not interested in 
the local elections. Some photos of the 
candidates were put up in the 
neighbourhood, but we know they are all 
corrupt and that they accumulated 
wealth during the siege; they benefitted 
from the trade and transfer of goods 
from Damascus and their sale here at 
inflated prices. I can say we have lost 
confidence in all of them. No-one here is 
concerned with the elections. Our apathy 
is even greater now than it was before 
2011.72  
Under these agreements, a large number of opposition 
fighters, civil activists, and their families were forcibly 
removed to the north of the country. This was a key 
condition to stopping the military offensives, and it was 
after this that the reconciliation areas saw a gradual 
return of the administrative, service, military, and security 
apparatus of the Syrian regime, with constant 
governmental promises of the return of public services 
and the improvement of living conditions. There were also 
assurances of safety for those who chose to stay and 
                                                     
72 Resident of al-Barzeh district in Damascus in interviews held during the 
writing of this paper 
73 تاباختنلاا لا تاحلاصملا ىلع نيعلا يروسلا بونجلا يف, Snack Syrian website: 
https://goo.gl/2PDWwN, date of publication August 25, 2018, last 
accessed October 18, 2018 
assurances that they would not be detained or subject to 
harassment by the security forces. These were mainly 
empty promises; according to residents’ testimonies 
from some of these areas, the harassment remained, as 
did the detention, which a large number of residents were 
subject to. Moreover, there were areas which did not see 
the return of all essential public services.  
As for the local elections of 2018, outward signs of the 
nomination and election processes were few and far 
between. There was hardly any electioneering witnessed, 
nor were any independent candidates observed. 
Campaigning was limited to a few signs, photographs and 
electoral tents affiliated with the National Unity lists, and 
was carried out under the predominant supervision of the 
Ba‘ath Party. It was clear that these lists would win by 
default, and most residents showed little interest in the 
elections. Some, indeed, had not even heard that the 
elections were being held in the first place.73  
By way of example, al-Ayam spoke with one of the 
members of the Reconciliation Committees in the al-Tall 
city in Rural Damascus in the north-west, which was 
outside regime control for five years, and for which a 
reconciliation agreement was signed in 2016. Abd al-Latif 
al-Bunni stated the following: “Today, we as activists in 
the public sphere are confronted with a certain reality, 
namely the people’s loss of hope in change. The old 
mentality that we saw five years ago has returned. Ba‘ath 
Party sub-branches are in control of the Educational 
Council, school managers, and their finances, and are 
appointing and firing whomever they want in al-Tall’s 
نيحشرم نود نم تادلبو ،تاباختنلاا نم اعرد ناكس مرحت ةيكزتلا, from 
https://goo.gl/2v1EFA, date of publication August 30, 2018, last accessed 
October 18, 2018 
Image 5 - Election campaign tent in Arbeen, Ghouta, an area previously under opposition control. Source: 
Social Media 
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institutions. The corruption has started to grow, and the 
good has begun to wither.”74  
 
 Everyone who wants to leave 
[Ghouta] in order to start working in 
Damascus, or set up their own work in 
Ghouta, is made to pay bribes daily to the 
security forces. Will the local councils be 
able to solve all these problems? 75  
 
In interviews held during the writing of this paper, one 
resident of al-Barzeh district in Damascus said, “Most 
people here are not interested in the local elections. Some 
photos of the candidates were put up in the 
neighbourhood, but we know they are all corrupt and that 
they accumulated wealth during the siege; they benefitted 
from the trade and transfer of goods from Damascus and 
their sale here at inflated prices. I can say we have lost 
confidence in all of them. No-one here is concerned with 
the elections. Our apathy is even greater now than it was 
before 2011.” 
A woman from the area of Kafr Batna in Eastern Ghouta 
communicated a similar feeling of disinterest, saying, “I 
would vote for the local councils if they are capable of 
protecting us and of providing us with job opportunities. 
Residents of Eastern Ghouta do not care about anything 
except living in a safe place and ensuring their protection 
from detention, which many young men are still being 
subject to despite promises to the contrary. We also want 
to get job opportunities and to be allowed to work as 
before without having to pay royalties to the security 
branches. Most of the families of Ghouta live off some 
kind of help coming in from abroad, and we still have not 
been able to get our lives back to like they were before the 
war. Everyone who wants to leave in order to start working 
in Damascus, or set up their own work in Ghouta, is made 
to pay bribes daily to the security forces. Will the local 
councils be able to solve all these problems?” 
 
                                                     
74 باوبلأا ىلع ةيلحملا ةرادلإا تاباختنا, al-Ayam website: https://goo.gl/BB9bsg, 
date of publication July 22, 2018, last accessed October 22, 2018  
75 A woman from the area of Kafr Batna in Eastern Ghouta in an interview 
conducted by the author 
76 هامح يف ةقرلاو بلدإب ةصاخ ةيباختنا رئاود, Ministry of Local Administration 
and Environment website: http://www.mola.gov.sy/mola/index.php/2018-
3.4 Areas Outside Syrian-Government 
Control 
By polling day, there were three main provinces that the 
Syrian government had still not retaken, these being 
Raqqa, Idlib and al-Hasakah. The Kurdish Democratic 
Union Party (PYD) and its military wing, the People’s 
Protection Units, was in control of al-Hasakah, the Syrian 
Democratic Forces in control of Raqqa, and the armed 
opposition factions in Idlib. It was therefore not possible 
to hold elections in these areas in the same way as they 
were being held in other areas.  
In Raqqa and Idlib, special constituencies were set up for 
them in Hama province, as per an announcement by the 
Ministry of Local Administration issued on July 29, 
2018.76 It was Hama in which the local administration had 
set up temporary centres for both Raqqa and Idlib since 
they left government control in 2014 and 2015 
respectively. The deputy governor of Raqqa province 
spoke about how the government was running elections 
in the parts of Raqqa over which they had control, and 
how ballot boxes had been set up in the different 
provinces where people from Raqqa were now residing. 
This was particularly concentrated in Hama, where 
Raqqa’s administrative affairs had been being carried out 
for several years.77  
Those who wished to put themselves up for nomination 
from these two provinces were told to go to any of 
Hama’s administrative units to submit their request, as 
confirmed by one of the candidates of Raqqa now living 
04-19-13-25-40/item/6663-2018-07-31-09-02-12, date of publication July 
29, 2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
77  ةرازو عقوم ىلع ،روزلا ريدو ةقرلاو بلح يف ةيلحملا ةرادلإل حشرتلا ىلع ريبك لابقإ
ةئيبلاو ةيلحملا ةرادلإا, Ministry of Local Administration and Environment 
website: http://www.mola.gov.sy/mola/index.php/2018-04-19-13-25-
39/item/6672-2018-07-31-13-23-30, date of publication July 31, 2018, last 
accessed October 11, 2018  
Image 6 - A polling station in Harasta, Eastern Ghouta, an area 
previously under opposition control. Source: Social Media 
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in Damascus. In an interview carried out in person, he said 
that he had put his name forward in Hama because it was 
the temporary headquarters of all administrative matters 
for Raqqa.  
Judge Ahmad al-Siyadi, the head of the Nomination 
Committee in Idlib province said that “Despite the 
exceptional circumstances facing the province and its 
departure from Syrian-government control, citizens from 
some of the areas under the control of armed factions 
have put themselves up for nomination in their 
designated centre in the city of Hama.”78  
The Judicial Branch Committee in both Raqqa and Idlib 
announced their coordination with the Administrative 
Committee to set up polling stations according to the 
geographic distribution of the residents of the two 
provinces, many of whom had been displaced to other 
areas of Syria. Despite this, some residents and Ba‘ath 
Party members from Idlib requested that the elections be 
delayed until the Syrian government had regained 
complete control and all those displaced had the 
possibility of returning.79 Perhaps these factors partly 
accounted for the low levels of nomination in the lists of 
these two provinces, particularly of women, and for the 
tens of withdrawals that happened a few days before the 
election. It could also account for the violations of the 
nomination conditions which stipulate that the current 
bureau chiefs in the province cannot be nominated for 
membership of the local councils, with the Idlib lists 
including two active bureau chiefs.80 
Al-Hasakah province, as mentioned above, witnessed 
mass withdrawals against the backdrop of detentions of 
tens of candidates by the security forces of the 
Autonomous State of North-East Syria, which refused to 
hold elections for the Syrian government in its area of 
control.81 This was reflected starkly on polling day, with 
the electoral process only taking place in the security 
square which was under the control of Syrian government 
forces. The rural centres were absent from the electoral 
process completely, out of fear of the restrictions that 
might be enforced by the security forces of the 
Autonomous State.82  
In this section, we have discussed all that concerns the 
process and mechanisms of nomination, and have shed 
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Syrian website: https://goo.gl/6DyMyr, date of publication August 16, 
2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
79 مهتظفاحم يف تاباختنلاا ليجأتب بلدإ يلاهأ نم تابلاطم يقيقح ليثمت ىلع ًاصرح, 
Snack Syrian website: https://goo.gl/obyvJ2, date of publication July 29, 
2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
80 اهعضو يتلا طورشلا فلاخت ثعبلا يحشرم ةمئاق, Snack Syrian website: 
https://goo.gl/12pY17, date of publication September 10, 2018, last 
accessed October 18, 2018  
light on different candidates or stakeholders who chose 
to stay away from the elections. We focused on the 
different experiences of those areas which were retaken 
by the Syrian government during the last two years and of 
those which remain outside of their control.  
In the next section, we will discuss the electoral process 
that took place on September 16, 2018, by looking at what 
went on in the course of that day, the violations that were 
witnessed, and the role that was played – or not played – 
by civil society and the media. We will then examine the 
results both on the province and district level, as well as 
the gender distribution of the election winners.  
4 The Electoral Process and Results 
 
Ahead of the elections themselves, there was no 
noticeable enthusiasm surrounding the elections on the 
streets of Syria. Field-level observations and face-to-face 
interviews with around 50 people (from Damascus, Rural 
Damascus, Tartus and Homs) revealed a sense of apathy 
and a low turnout to the polls, as a consequence of the 
despair felt with the predetermined nature of the results.  
 
81 ةيلحملا ةرادلإا تاباختنا نم ةلمجلاب تاباحسنا ةكسحلا, Snack Syrian website 
https://goo.gl/q9ZzV2, date of publication September 5, 2018, last 
accessed October 18, 2018   
ماظنلل ةيلحملا تاباختنلاا عطاقت ةيتاذلا ةرادلإا, from Jorf News website: 
http://jorfnews.com/portal/?p=15909, date of publication September 2, 
2018, last accessed September 21, 2018 
82 مويلا عارتقلاا زكارم يف نوماني قيدانص ءانمأ ،فيقوتلاو لاقتعلاا نم ًافوخ, Snack 
Syrian website: https://goo.gl/AYkyYU, date of publication September 15, 
2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
Image 7 - University students queue to cast their votes at the Student’s 
Residence at Damascus University. Source: Social Media 
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 It’s all just for show. We know nothing 
of the candidates except for their photos 
and have no idea what they will offer us. 
Most of them know they will win before 
the votes are even in.83  
 
Even the responses of those who showed some interest 
in the election betrayed a similar sense: “We will go to the 
polling station and cross out all the names from the list 
because all are known to be corrupt”; “I am participating 
purely out of respect for the constitution and my right to 
vote, but I haven’t the slightest hope that anything will 
actually change”; and “I will be boycotting these elections 
as an expression of my frustration.”  
 
Against this backdrop, Snack Syrian carried out an online 
opinion poll about the attitudes of Syrians towards the 
elections. The results were clear: “81% of those who 
participated in the poll do not believe that these elections 
will be any better than the last ones.” Among the cited 
reasons was “frustration with the last round of elections 
whereby candidates were effectively appointed to their 
seats rather than being voted in. They will succeed 
regardless, having been brought in through closed and 
                                                     
83 Interviews with a random sample of Damascus residents  
84 اهتاقباس نم لضفأ نوكت نل ةمداقلا تاباختنلاا ،يأر علاطتسا, Snack Syrian 
website: https://goo.gl/SuzWKM, date of publication August 21, 2018, last 
accessed September 22, 2018  
pre-prepared lists, just like in the past elections. Even if 
these are slightly better than the previous elections, the 
election winners are still backed by the government, most 
were not up to the responsibility of the job, and they put 
distance between themselves and the citizens. Likewise, 
they applied the law only in part and ignored those articles 
which were supposed to increase trust in the councils. 
Most importantly perhaps, in terms of what affected 
public opinion, instructions were issued on the last day of 
nomination to state employees and party members that 
they should put themselves up for a nomination. This 
would make it seem to media and news outlets as though 
there were a large number of candidates and that the 
turnout to the nomination process was high.”84  
 
The same website held an opinion poll at the University of 
Aleppo on interest in the election. The results were clear: 
“The majority of university students are not interested in 
the election, and one out of ten will be participating in the 
upcoming election. Eight out of ten said that the election 
will not change anything, and six out of ten see that these 
are bogus elections whose process is little more than 
selection. Meanwhile, seven out of ten students see that 
the local councils have no actual power and that the 
decisions will be coming from the capital, namely from 
the central power which commands the authority of the 
local councils.”85 
85 ةمداقلا تاباختنلال ةيبلسب بلح ةعماج يف بلاط رظني بابسلأا هذهل, Snack Syria 
website: https://goo.gl/SuzWKM, date of publication August 26, 2018, last 
accessed October 18, 2018  
Image 8 - University 
students wait outside 
a polling station to 
cast their votes at the 
Student’s Residence 
at Damascus. 
Source: Social Media. 
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Further to this, the website Enab Baladi carried out an 
opinion poll on August 31 in which they asked 
participants if they had previously voted in local elections, 
with the result being that 77% had not.86  
Al-Ayam, in turn, asked a number of citizens about the 
local councils in their districts. They responded that they 
knew nothing of either the local councils or of Law 107 
and that they had lost hope in the idea of real elections 
because of previous experiences.87 The newspaper also 
indicated the results from the first local election 
experience had not been encouraging for the candidates 
or the voters, since many mayors and council members 
were selected, in order to replace the members who were 
dismissed for some reason or another. It was assumed 
that the newly elected members had been selected by the 
previously elected members.88 
 
4.1 Election Day, September 16, 2018 
Local administration elections took place in Syria on 
September 16, 2018. This was not to be a national holiday, 
but rather a normal day of work and study in all 
governmental, private and educational institutions.  
 
Turnout to the polls in the different Syrian towns and 
cities was poor, according to field observations and 
interviews with people from these areas.89 Most of the 
voters were state employees or students who were 
instructed by their employer or university to go to the polls 
or were friends and family of the candidates themselves. 
There were attempts outside the polling stations and 
government bureaus to get passers-by to go in and vote, 
by handing out the National Unity lists in the street, 
without significant success.90  
 
Against this backdrop, an incident was observed in 
Darayya in western Rural Damascus which revealed how 
greatly the Syrian government sought to misrepresent 
reality, and revealed, in turn, the level of interest there was 
in the districts where the government had control over the 
elections. The city of Darayya left Syrian government 
                                                     
86 Opinion poll on Enab Baladi website: 
https://www.enabbaladi.net/archives/249124#ixzz5PleXxdLi, date of 
publication August 31, 2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
87 باوبلأا ىلع ةيلحملا ةرادلإا تاباختنا, al-Ayam website: https://goo.gl/BB9bsg, 
date of publication July 22, 2018, last accessed October 22, 2018  
88 ةيلحملا ةرادلإا تاباختنا لبق ام ءاوجأ ءارقتسا لصاوت مايلأا, al-Ayam website: 
https://goo.gl/eT8dCS, date of publication July 29, 2018, last accessed 
October 18, 2018   
89 يباختنا زكرم ثعبلا عئلاط رقمو فيعض لابقإ قشمد, Snack Syrian website: 
https://goo.gl/FTb7Tr, date of publication September 16, 2018, last 
accessed October 18, 2018  
90 According to numbers from the Ministry of Local Administration and 
Environment, the number of eligible voters on election day was roughly 
16,350,000 
control in 2012, and its people suffered a brutal war and 
ruthless siege until August 2016 when a reconciliation 
deal was signed between the Syrian regime and the 
opposition factions. All the residents were forcibly 
removed and Syrian government control was restored. 
Since that time, and up until the day of the local elections, 
the residents of Darayya were not allowed to return to 
their homes. However, one day before the elections, the 
regime-led executive office of the municipality sent an 
invitation to the people of Darayya on its Facebook page 
to return and to cast their votes at the ballot box.91 
According to field testimonies, no-one was forced to vote, 
but many residents preferred to take part, raise flags and 
cheer for the government in order to avoid trouble. This 
incident was then exploited to falsely demonstrate the 
interest of the reconciliation areas in the local elections.92  
 
Furthermore, many violations of the Local Administration 
Law were witnessed, according to several media reports. 
This was in stark contrast to the assurances of the High 
Judicial Committee for Elections about the preparedness 
of the polling centres and their utmost commitment to the 
law.93  
 
The following are examples of violations of the law 
witnessed and spoken about in the media:94  
- No scrutiny with regard to ‘election ink’, meaning that 
people were able to vote more than once;  
- The entry of candidates’ agents – or the candidates 
themselves – into the polling booth and their 
monitoring of the electoral process; this even 
amounted to them casting others’ votes and 
preventing the voters from writing names of others 
they wanted to elect; 
- The placing of the National Unity lists next to the 
ballot boxes or within the polling booths, with these 
sometimes being the only lists available within the 
polling station, and the independent lists being 
excluded on purpose; 
91 Facebook post from the Executive Office of Darayya Town, found at: 
https://goo.gl/KTXN33, date of publication September 15, 2018, last 
accessed October 18, 2018  
92  ةمهاسملاو ةيلوؤسملاب يلاعلا روعشلاو ةينطولا ةلاحلا سركتل تءاج ةيلحملا تاباختنلاا
يطارقميدلا ءانبلا ةريسم يف, Ministry of Local Administration and Environment 
website: http://www.mola.gov.sy/mola/index.php/2018-04-19-13-25-
39/item/6893-2018-09-17-11-43-39, date of publication September 17, 
2018, last accessed October 24, 2018 
93 مويلا عارتقلاا قيدانص ىلإ نويروسلا, al-Watan website: 
http://alwatan.sy/archives/166207, date of publication September 16, 
2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
94 The “Your Turn” campaign was set up by the Nation Building Movement 
to strengthen the role of civil society in the local council elections, and 
which also observed a number of violations on polling day; its Facebook 
page can be found at: https://www.facebook.com/dawrak/?ref=br_rs 
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- Lack of private booths at all polling stations, which is 
a condition of vote casting; 
- Lack of scrutiny of those voting more than once; 
- Lack of introductory lists with all the names of 
candidates in front of the ballot boxes; 
- The mass turnout of employees and workers from 
certain areas, suggesting that they were sent with 
that purpose; 
- Registering identity documents of voters who were 
not there and voting on their behalf; 
- Removal of ballot boxes from some polling stations 
such as al-Mukharram, Jab al-Jarrah and al-Mazineh 
in Rural Homs and the assumption of victory of the 
National Unity lists despite the presence of 
independent candidates; 
- Coercion of students from the Ba‘ath University in 
Homs to vote as a condition of their departure from 
campus.95  
As for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who left their 
homes during the war, they could vote in their new 
residence on the issuing of a document confirming their 
place of residence without a particular minimum time of 
residence required.96 According to interviews with IDPs 
from the provinces of Homs and Deir Ezzor, as well as 
Eastern Ghouta and those residing in Damascus, the local 
council elections were not an area of interest for them. 
One said, “What can the local council, whose nepotism we 
are all accustomed to, offer me after we lost our property 
and were displaced from our land? We were not interested 
in these elections when we were in our city [of Deir Ezzor], 
so why would we take an interest now?” 
 
4.2 Role of Civil Society and the Media  
Given the nascent nature of civil society in Syria, its huge 
criss-crossing divisions in the different areas of regime 
control, and the transfer of large numbers of them during 
the war years to the relief sector, it is hard to ascertain the 
scale of their efforts during the local elections. However, 
according to personal accounts, these did not seem 
particularly significant, and they were not able to really 
penetrate the electoral process with all the nepotism, 
corruption and violations that accompanied it.  
Discussion can here be made about those campaigns 
that were set up to strengthen the role of civil society 
during the elections. The most prominent and impactful 
of these was the ‘Your Turn’ campaign, launched by the 
                                                     
95 باختنلاا ىلع نوربجي صمحب ثعبلا ةعماج يف بلاط, Snack Syrian website: 
https://goo.gl/ognsGo, date of publication September 16, 2018, last 
accessed October 18, 2018  
96 ةيلحملا سلاجملا يحشرم رايتخاب يهتني لفاح يباختنا موي, Tishreen news website: 
http://tishreen.news.sy/?p=218023, date of publication September 17, 
2018, last accessed October 12, 2018  
Nation Building Movement in Damascus; it increased 
awareness about the elections, their conditions and key 
legal stipulations, built the capacity of some of the 
candidates in affairs of local administration and observed 
the electoral affairs and campaigns. This included 
election day itself, where it monitored violations and rule 
breaking.  
 
The efforts of particular activists and journalists should 
also be discussed, especially those who had some 
knowledge of the Local Administration Law. These efforts 
became clear through awareness-raising about the 
elections in the weeks preceding them, and through the 
observation and monitoring on election day.  
In an interview with a civil society activist, the interviewee 
spoke about “the difficulty of acknowledging the 
existence of an effective and real role of civil society and 
the media during the local elections. There are civil 
society groups which have completely boycotted the 
elections, and there are people who believe in their ability 
to enter into the elections and succeed in creating 
change. However, these are few and far between and they 
do not have a real impact. This is first and foremost down 
to the continued grouping of civil society efforts as if they 
are simply parties or NGOs or charities, and the lack of 
understanding about what the real role of civil society is. 
This would require an in-depth knowledge of electoral law, 
not to mention the ability to act as auditor and invigilator 
in these elections and other political action in Syria.” 
 
4.3 Election Results  
On September 20, the Ministry of Local Administration 
announced the completion of the vote count in the local 
councils, as well as a five-day grace period in which an 
appeal of the results could be made. The Ministry stated 
that the turnout had been 56% of eligible voters, who total 
approximately 16,300,000 people.97 This is significantly 
higher than what was observed through field 
observations, one-on-one interviews, and media reports 
mentioned above, which cite voter participation as being 
poor in some areas, and almost non-existent in others.  
The announcement of the results was done in each 
province separately, it is the remit of the province-wide 
branch committees and not the High Judicial Committee 
which was overseeing the elections. Many constituencies 
announced the results starting on polling day before the 
97  ةرادلإا ةرازو عقوم ىلع ،ةيلحملا ةرادلإا تاباختنا يف تاوصلأا زرف ةيلمع ءاهتنا
ةئيبلاو ةيلحملا, Ministry of Local Administration and Environment website: 
http://www.mola.gov.sy/mola/index.php/2018-04-19-13-25-
40/item/6924-2018-09-20-10-34-30, date of publication September 20, 
2018, last accessed October 18, 2018  
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vote count was completed; the National Unity lists won by 
default in more than one constituency because of a lack 
of enough alternative candidates to fill the seats 
designated in the local council. Among these 
constituencies are the following:  
- In the provinces of Idlib and Raqqa – two areas 
outside the Syrian government control – the National 
Unity lists won by default,98 with the absence of 
effective election proceedings in Hama, as 
confirmed by many people who are from one of these 
two areas and residing in Damascus; 
- In the area of Talkalakh in Homs, ballot boxes were 
eliminated given the withdrawal of independent 
candidates, and the National Unity list was left to win 
by default;99  
- The National Unity list won in the two areas of al-
Shajara and Yarmouk Basin in Daraa province by 
default with elections not having been held, and 
ballot boxes not having been sent there at all, given 
that these two areas had only just been retaken by 
the Syrian government.100  
- The National Unity lists won in the province of al-
Hasakah by default, with the elections being merely 
a symbolic exercise given mass withdrawals of 
candidates, out of fear of detentions that were being 
carried out by the SDF.101  
Other constituencies did not announce their results for 
two or three days, with a delay in some areas on account 
of counting errors, or vote manipulation.102  
Regarding female winners, there are no official statistics, 
as was the case with the candidate lists. However, some 
figures can be drawn from the results announced online, 
and these indicate that the number of women who 
attained seats in the incoming local councils was low.  
To give an example, by looking at the results which give 
the names of the winners, there appear to be 173 female 
winners out of a total of 1303 people who gained seats, 
namely 13%.103 In some of the lists of winners that were 
published online, the number of female winners in 
particular cities and provinces can be seen, including in 
the following: 
                                                     
98 تاباختنلاا ءدب لبق اوحجن نوحشرم, Snack Syrian website: 
https://goo.gl/2cSvYF, date of publication September 16, 2018, last 
accessed October 18, 2018 
99 News on the Dimashq Now Facebook page, found at 
https://goo.gl/yr9yoG, date of publication, September 16, 2018, last 
accessed, October 18, 2018 
100 نودقتني نونطاومو ةيباختنلاا ةيلمعلاب نوبجعم نولوؤسملا :اعرد, Snack Syrian 
website: https://goo.gl/ZD3SJc, date of publication September 16, 2018, 
last accessed October 18, 2018  
101 صمحو ةكسحلا يف ةيلحملا تاباختنلااب ةينطولا ةدحولا مئاوق زوف, al-Watan 
website: http://alwatan.sy/archives/166759, date of publication 
September 19, 2018, last accessed October 18, 2018 
102 ةيقذلالاب ناسرفلا ةقيدح يف ةيلحملا ةرادلإا سلاجمل تاباختنلاا ةداعإ ةيلمع تهتنا, 
Local Administration and Environment Ministry website: 
- Province of as-Suwayda council: 1 woman among 28 
winners in Group A and 1 woman among 25 winners 
in Group B 
- City of Al-Safira council: no women among 33 
winners 
- Al-Qatifa council in Rural Damascus: no women 
among 8 winners 
- Nahiet al-Kiswah council in Rural Damascus: no 
women among 6 winners 
- Area of al-Nabek council in Rural Damascus: 1 
woman among 8 winners 
- Town of Rabiaa council in Rural Hama: no women 
among 10 winners 
- Jobar and Barzeh and al-Qaboun in Rural Damascus 
council: 4 women among 35 winners 
- Darayya and Babbila council in Damascus: 1 woman 
among 11 winners 
- Al-Midan and al-Qadam council in Damascus: 3 
women among 34 winners 
- Douma council in Rural Damascus: 3 women among 
24 winners 
- Sarouja and Amara and Shaghour council in 
Damascus: 3 women among 35 winners 
- Arabayn and Jaramana and al-Malayha and Kafr 
Batna council in Rural Damascus: 1 woman among 
10 winners  
- Arabayn council: no women among 25 winners  
- Qudsaya council in Rural Damascus: 2 women 
among 7 winners  
- Qatna council in Rural Damascus: no women among 
8 winners 
- Al-Qanawat and Kafr Susa and Mezze and Kiwan and 
Damer council in Damascus: 9 women among 35 
winners 
- Muhajireen and Salihiya and Akrad council in 
Damascus: 2 women among 37 winners  
- Yabroud council in Rural Damascus: 1 woman 
among 4 winners 
- Candidates from the Syrian Socialist National Party 
across Syria: 1 woman among 18 winners 
 
http://www.mola.gov.sy/mola/index.php/2018-04-19-13-25-
39/item/6928-212, date of publication September 20, 2018, last accessed 
October 18, 2018  
هزوف نلاعإ دعب تاباختنلاا رسخي حشرم ،قشمد فير يف ثدح, Syria al-Hadath News 
Network website: http://event.sy/news-29509.html, date of publication 
September 20, 2018, last accessed October 18, 2018 
ةيلحملا ةرادلإا تاباختنا جئاتن نلاعإ رخؤت سوطرط يف ةفلاخم, Shamra News 
website: 
https://shamra.sy/news/article/ad9b82a125fe506b5bef7a46e625e3e1, 
date of publication September 18, 2018, last accessed October 18, 2018 
103 2018 ماعل 305و 304 نيموسرملا ردصي سيئرلا, Sana website: 
https://www.sana.sy/?p=823310, date of publication October 3, 2018, last 
accessed October 24, 2018 
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The matter of the local council elections did not end with 
the announcement of the results and publishing of the 
winners. The violations which were observed, and which 
we have discussed in this paper, drove one of the 
candidates from Tartus to file a lawsuit to prove the 
invalidity of the elections in his province. He argued his 
case on the basis of various violations committed, 
including the casting of votes by those who were either 
not present, ineligible to vote or deceased, in more than 
one polling station. More than a month after the election 
results announcements, local news outlets reported that 
the Supreme Administrative Court had ruled that the vote 
in 18 constituencies in Tartus was void and that re-
elections should be held there, based on the complaint of 
the aforementioned candidate. This was considered “a 
precedent which underscores the supremacy of the law 
and the independence of the judiciary.”104  
5 Conclusions and recommendations  
 
This paper has presented a summary of all details 
pertaining to the process of local elections that were 
carried out in Syria in September 2018. It looked at the 
legal context of these elections, the way in which this 
process was carried out, both in the nomination process 
and the candidates from different backgrounds and 
sectors, and in the voting process itself. The paper also 
presented people’s perception of these elections and 
analysed the reasons behind their disinterest in it. 
The paper offers an opportunity for understanding how is 
power practised in Syria, and the level of trust in the 
election process, the impact of this low level of trust on 
participation and on results, in addition to understanding 
the gap between law and implementation in Syria and its 
potential consequences.  
 
5.1 Conclusions 
 
We present here some of the conclusions of this paper; 
 
1. Elections as a political message 
 
It is important to look into the reasons behind the 
insistence of the Syrian government to hold the local 
elections at this particular period. These reasons, as 
posited by this paper, included economic and political 
                                                     
104  18 يف ةيلحملا تاباختنلاا جئاتن لطبي ءاضقلا اهعون نم ىلولأا نوكت دق ةقباس يف
سوطرط يف ردب خيشلا ةقطنمب ًازكرم, al-Watan website: 
http://alwatan.sy/archives/172495, date of publication November 4, 2018, 
last accessed November 8, 2018  
gains that the government wished to acquire on the long 
term and the short term.  
On the one hand, these elections can be seen as a political 
gain which in turn allows for the consolidation of field-
level gains secured by the Syrian regime in the battles of 
Eastern Ghouta, in Rural Damascus and Daraa in the 
south of the country. Through these elections, the Syrian 
government has tried to show that it is striving to pursue 
an agenda of democracy in its political affairs. This 
became very evident in a speech by Syrian President 
Bashar al-Assad during his meeting with the elected local 
councillors in February 2019. He pointed out that these 
elections “culminate in an important stage of the mission 
of restoring security and defeating terrorism and 
confirms the strength of the people and the state and 
proves once again the failure of the enemies’ 
Transforming the Syrian state into a failed state that is 
unable to carry out its constitutional duties105. 
 
In another sense, the Syrian government has been in a 
rush to give the impression of stability both on a political 
and economic level, and of its ability to begin the process 
of reconstruction. The only thing that would stop or delay 
the elections according to its narrative would be “the war 
on terrorism,” and the holding of elections would 
ostensibly be a declaration of the end of the war and of 
the readiness to start the process of reconstruction.  
 
2. The political economy of the local elections and the 
era of reconstructions 
 
There has been a very heavy focus during the recent 
election period on decentralisation, both in the media and 
in the national rhetoric, and the link made between the 
elections and reconstruction of a new Syria. This is 
through media reports,106 and through the holding of 
seminars on the Local Administration Law and its effect 
on the reconstruction process in Syria. One of these was 
held in August, one month before the elections, with one 
of the regional leadership members of the Ba‘ath Party 
stating: “the reconstruction period requires the presence 
of local councils capable of moving this forward,” adding 
that “the local councils are the outlet through which 
developmental plans decided on by the government can 
be carried out. These plans need real support structures 
able to reflect developmental plans, programs and 
projects in real terms, to improve the economic situation 
105 The text of the full speech is available at SANA website 
via https://www.sana.sy/?p=896762 
106  سلاجم تاباختنا يف ةكراشملا ةيمهأ ىلع ًاديكأت ةكسحلا ةنيدم طسو يريهامج دشح
ةيلحملا ةرادلإا, Sana website: https://www.sana.sy/?p=815600, date of 
publication September 16, 2018, last accessed October 11, 2018 
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and services. Therefore, we require strong local councils 
whose members have the experience, capacity and a 
positive reputation as well as a high profile and the ability 
to meet people’s needs, those who put their trust in them. 
It is this which we are working to achieve, and which we 
portray outwardly to articulate our democracy, through 
which others can view us.”107 
Law 107 gave the local councils – on the level of province, 
city or township – local authority over some aspect of the 
economy and construction investments, and thus the 
elected councils will have a strong role in the upcoming 
reconstruction phase, with regard to both planning and 
implementation. It is important therefore for the regime to 
ensure to ensure that members of these councils are 
strong supporters. It is important, too, to note the 
formation in 2014 of the Reconstruction Committee and 
the appointment of the Minister of Local Administration 
as its president108. Among the committee’s tasks is the 
implementation of projects regarding the return of 
essential services and the rehabilitation of infrastructure 
in the destroyed areas.109 It is this which explains the 
interest of Holding companies and businessmen in 
funding those close to them in order to gain access to the 
local councils.  
Similarly, Law 10 issued in April 2018 allows for the 
introduction of new regulatory areas based on the 
suggestion of the Minister of Local Administration and 
Environment110.  It also gives the executive office within 
the administrative unit wide-reaching powers in planning 
and implementation for the new regulatory areas. And it 
is here that the importance of electing new local councils 
to start to apply this law becomes important since it 
would not be legal to apply the new law with council 
members whose term has already ended. It is also 
advantageous to apply the law with the implication that it 
is part of Syria’s decentralisation, giving a more positive 
outward image of the country in the hope of convincing 
regional and western governments to invest in a Syria 
whose climate is one of democracy, openness and 
decentralisation.  
 
3. The implementation gap 
 
The current local administration law, and despite all its 
shortcomings, increases the powers of the local 
authorities and opens the door for Syrians to participate 
in local councils. But despite the fact that the elections 
                                                     
107 For more about the seminar see Baath Media website: 
https://goo.gl/LWEhpc 
108 Full text of the decision signed by the Ministry of Local Administration 
and Environment: https://goo.gl/zPN9PL 
took place in areas that host Syrians with diverse political 
backgrounds, including those loyal to the regime and 
those who do express openly their opposition views, yet, 
Syrians did not seem to be very keen on taking this 
opportunity. This reflects the gap between the text of the 
law and its implementation. This gap does not only come 
from the way the Syrian government applies the law, but 
also because of the citizens' impressions of the law and 
of the overall system of governance. These impressions 
can be summed up based on the interviews made in this 
paper as follows: 
 
a) The big loss of confidence in the overall system of 
governance including the regime and its laws. This is 
reflected even among the ranks of those who are not 
classified politically as opponents of the regime. 
b) A significant spread of a sense of futility. This has 
been reflected in the low number of candidates and 
the numbers of elected candidates and through 
some their statements, which reflect the loss of hope 
for real change, even when the law provides a 
legislative opportunity for this change, and a state of 
recognition by voters that the results are 
predetermined even before the official 
announcement. 
c) High awareness that the electoral process in Syria is 
merely mockery elections. 
d) The significant deterioration in the standard of living 
of most Syrians and their preoccupation with survival 
priorities. This contributed to their indifference to the 
elections and to the inability of many of them to run 
and compete. 
 
The gap between legislation, implementation and 
practice is also evident by the fact that the Baath Party 
continues to dominate the elections, although the 2012 
constitutional change theoretically ended the Baath 
Party's single control of the state and society. 
 
4. Women's Participation 
 
Neither the Local Administration law nor the General 
Elections law does contain any provisions concerning the 
allocation of quotas to women. Women’s representation 
in the elected councils of 2011 accounted for no more 
than 3%. As for the 2018 elections, there were no official 
figures on women's participation, but what we observed, 
109 ايروس يف اهليهأت متيس يتلا قطانملاو عيراشملا نع فشكت رامعلإا ةداعإ ةنجل, Sham 
Times website: https://goo.gl/H4Xp3b, date of publication October 14, 
2018, last accessed October 19, 2018  
110 The full text of the law is found on the Syrian Arab Republic Prime 
Ministry website: https://goo.gl/P6miGv  
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is that the percentage of women on the lists of candidates 
and on the successful lists did not exceed 10% in most 
areas. This contrasts with the image the Syrian 
government is trying to suggest, which claims that there 
is active participation by women in the political process in 
areas under its security control compared to the 
opposition control areas, where the participation rates of 
women on local councils are also very low. We also noted 
the reluctance of leading women figures in the country to 
participate in the elections and that they mobilised their 
parties to boycott the elections because they do not 
believe in their usefulness. 
The war in Syria has increased the proportion of women 
to men, many of whom have died or been arrested or left 
the country to escape conscription. This was reflected in 
the situation of women, many of whom became the main 
provider for their families, which increased their 
participation in the labour market111. This should be 
matched with an increase in the representation of women 
and their interests in local councils. Access to these 
councils, as we have observed, requires involvement in 
networks of cronies, corruption and favouritism, which 
are usually dominated by men. 
 
5.2 Policy Implications  
 
This paper shows that constitutional and legal changes 
are a necessary but insufficient condition for the process 
of democratic transition in Syria. Any meaningful political 
transition process will indeed require substantial changes 
in constitutional and legal frameworks and should be 
based on electoral processes at several levels. But these 
amendments and procedures alone will remain futile and 
could end up a façade for the authoritarian regime, if not 
accompanied by other conditions and measures.  
 
In addition to legal changes, real change requires actions 
that restore confidence in the overall system of 
governance and at all levels.  
 
Several insurance policies are needed in order for the 
Syrians to believe in any legal change and to be more 
likely to complying with it and thus giving it meaning or 
legitimacy. What is needed is first; wide consultation and 
participation in the construction of these laws; second for 
them to have confidence that these laws and procedures, 
such as elections are designed to serve their public 
                                                     
111 Syria's 'era of women': War leaves streets empty of men. Middle East 
Eye Website: https://goo.gl/sfhPcA, date of publication 23 July 2018, last 
accessed October 19, 2018. 
interest, and third, that the process should be as inclusive 
as possible. 
 
A genuine democratic process of change in Syria also 
requires a structural change in the political economy that 
allows the dismantling of the relationship between power 
and money, that opens up for all the possibility of equal 
and fair participation and benefiting from the process of 
development and reconstruction, and that allows citizens 
to exercise their supervisory and monitory role in a 
manner protected by law. 
 
The increase in the proportion of female breadwinners in 
Syria and their increased participation in the labour 
market in Syria present another reason for the calling for 
quotas for women in elections to ensure their fair 
representation. Increasing their representation is also an 
important entry point for changing the political economy 
structure of the local councils, thus weakening the 
networks of private interests and reducing corruption, 
because of the weak participation of women in these 
networks. It is not enough to allocate a quota for women 
alone to encourage them to participate in the elections 
and to run for them. What is also required is a number of 
procedures and programs of political empowerment and 
capacity building for women. 
 
The process of change in Syria will not be easy and will 
take a long time, but not putting the process of change on 
the right track from the outset will only ensure progress in 
the wrong direction.
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